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Preface
Rough sets over generalized transitive relations like proto-transitive ones have been initiated
by the present author in the year 2012 [1]. Subsequently [2], approximation of proto-transitive
relations by other relations was investigated and the relation with rough approximations was
developed towards constructing semantics that can handle fragments of structure. It was also
proved that difference of approximations induced by some approximate relations need not
induce rough structures. In this research we develop different semantics of proto transitive
rough sets (PRAX) after characterizing the structure of rough objects and also develop a
theory of dependence for general rough sets and use it to internalize the Nelson-algebra
based approximate semantics developed earlier [2]. The theory of rough dependence initiated
later [3] by the present author is extended in the process. This monograph is reasonably
self-contained and includes proofs and extensions of representation of objects that were not
part of earlier papers.
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1 Introduction
Proto-transitivity is one of the infinite number of possible generalizations of transitivity.
These types of generalized relations happen often in application contexts. Failure to
recognize them causes mathematical models to be inadequate or underspecified and tends
to unduly complicate algorithms and approximate methods. From among the many
possible alternatives that fall under generalized transitivity, we chose proto-transitivity
because of application contexts, its simple set theoretic definition, connections with factor
relations and consequent generative value among such relations. It has a special role in
modelling knowledge as well.
Proto-transitive approximation spaces PRAX have been introduced by the present author
in [1] and the structure of definite objects has been characterized in it to a degree. It is
relatively a harder structure from a semantic perspective as the representation of rough
objects is involved [1]. Aspects of knowledge interpretation in PRAX contexts have been
considered in [1] and in [2] the relation of approximations resulting from approximation
of relations to the approximations from the original relation are studied in the context
of PRAX. These are used for defining an approximate semantics for PRAX and their
limitations are explored by the present author in the same paper. All of these are
expanded upon in this monograph.
Rough objects as explained in [4,5] are collections of objects in a classical domain (Meta-
C) that appear to be indistinguishable among themselves in another rough semantic
domain (Meta-R). But their representation in most RSTs in purely order theoretic terms
is not known. For PRAX, this is solved in [1]. Rough objects in a PRAX need not
correspond to intervals of the form ]a, b[ with the definite object b covering (in the ordered
set of definite objects) the definite object a.
If R is a relation on a set S, then R can be approximated by a wide variety of partial or
quasi-order relations in both classical and rough set perspective [6]. Though the methods
are essentially equivalent for binary relations, the latter method is more general. When
the relation R satisfies proto-transitivity, then many new properties emerge. This aspect
is developed further in the present monograph and most of [2] is included.
When R is a quasi-order relation, then a semantics for the set of ordered pairs of lower and
upper approximations {(Al, Au); A ⊆ S} has recently been developed in [7, 8]. Though
such a set of ordered pairs of lower and upper approximations are not rough objects in
the PRAX context, we can use the approximations for an additional semantic approach
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to it. We prove that differences of consequent lower and upper approximations suggest
partial structures for measuring structured deviation. The developed method should also
be useful for studying correspondences between the different semantics [9, 10]. Because
of this we devote some space to the nature of transformation of granules by the relational
approximation process.
In this research monograph, we also investigate the nature of possible concepts of rough
dependence first. Though the concept of independence is well studied in probability the-
ory, the concept of dependence is rarely explored in any useful way. It has been shown
to be very powerful in classical probability theory [11] - the formalism is valid over prob-
ability spaces, but its axiomatic potential is left unexplored. Connections between rough
sets and probability theory have been explored from rough measure and information en-
tropy viewpoint in a number of papers [12–16]. The nature of rough independence is also
explored in [3] by the present author and there is some overlap with the present work.
Apart from problems relating to contamination, we show that the comparison by way of
corresponding concepts of dependence fails in a very essential way.
Further, using the introduced concepts of rough dependence we internalize the approxi-
mate semantics instead of depending on correspondences. This allows for richer variants
of the earlier semantics of rough objects.
This monograph is reasonably self-contained and is organized as follows: In the rest of
this chapter we introduce the basics of proto-transitivity, recall relevant information of
Nelson algebras, granules and granulations. In the following chapter, we define relevant
approximations in PRAX and study their basic properties and those of definite elements.
In the third chapter, we propose an abstract and three other extended examples justify-
ing our study. In the following chapter, we describe the algebraic structures that can be
associated with the semantic properties of definite objects in a PRAX. The representation
of rough objects is done from an interesting perspective in the fifth chapter. In the sixth
chapter, we define new derived operators in a PRAX and consider their connection with
non monotonic reasoning. These are of relevance in representation again. In the following
chapter, atoms in the partially ordered set of rough object are described. This is followed
by an algebraic semantics that relies on multiple types of aggregation and commonality
operations. In the ninth chapter, a partial semantics similar to the increasing Nelson
algebraic semantics is formulated. This semantics is completed in three different ways
in the fourteenth chapter after internalization of dependency. In the tenth and eleventh
chapters approximate relations and approximate semantics are considered - the material
in these chapters includes expansions of the results in [2]. In the following two chap-
ters, we define concepts of rough dependence, compare them with those of probabilistic
dependence and demonstrate their stark differences - the material in these chapters are
expansions of [3]. The knowledge interpretation of PRAX is revisited in the fifteenth
chapter.
1.1 Basic Concepts, Terminology
Definition 1.1. A binary relation R on a set S is said to be weakly-transitive, transitive
or proto-transitive respectively on S if and only if S satisfies
⋆ If whenever Rxy, Ryz and x 6= y 6= z holds, then Rxz. (i.e. (R ◦ R) \∆S ⊆ R
(where ◦ is relation composition) , or
⋆ whenever Rxy & Ryz holds then Rxz (i.e. (R ◦R) ⊆ R), or
⋆ Whenever Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, Rzy and x 6= y 6= z holds, then Rxz follows, re-
spectively. Proto-transitivity of R is equivalent to R ∩ R−1 = τ(R) being weakly
transitive.
We will use the following simpler example to illustrate many of the concepts and situa-
tions in the monograph. For detailed motivations see Ch.3 on motivation and examples.
Persistent Example 1.1. A simple real-life example of a proto-transitive, non transitive
relation would be the relation P, defined by
Pxy if and only if x thinks that y thinks that color of object O is a maroon.
But we will use the following simple example from databases as a persistent one (especially
in the chapters on approximation of relations) to illustrate a number of concepts. It has
other attributes apart from the main one for illustrating more involved aspects.
Let I be survey data in table form with column names being for sex, gender, sexual orien-
tations, other personal data and opinions on sexist contexts with each row corresponding
to a person. We write
Rab if and only if person a agrees with b′s opinions.
The predicate agrees with can be constructed empirically or from the data by a suitable
heuristic. Often R is a proto-transitive, reflexive relation and this condition can be im-
posed to complete partial data as well (as a rationality condition). If a agrees with the
opinions of b, then we will say that a is an ally of b - if b is also an ally of a, then they
are comrades. Finding optimal subsets of allies can be an interesting problem in many
contexts especially given the fact that responses may have some vagueness in them.
Definition 1.2. A binary relation R on a set S is said to be semi-transitive on S if and
only if S satisfies
⋆ Whenever τ(R)ab&Rbc holds then Rac follows and
⋆ Whenever τ(R)ab&Rca holds then Rcb follows.
Henceforth we will use Rxy for (x, y) ∈ R uniformly. Ref(S), Sym(S), T ol(S), rτ(S),
wτ(S), pτ(S), sτ(S), EQ(S) will respectively denote the set of reflexive, symmetric, tol-
erance, transitive, weakly transitive, pseudo transitive, semi-transitive and equivalence
relations on the set S respectively.
The following proposition has steep ontological commitments.
Prop 1.1. For a relation R on a set S, the following are satisfied:
⋆ R is weakly transitive if and only if (R ∩R−1) \∆S ⊆ R.
⋆ R is transitive if and only if (R ∩R−1) ⊆ R.
By a pseudo order, we will mean an antisymmetric, reflexive relation. A quasi-order
is a reflexive, transitive relation, while a partial order a reflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive relation.
Let α ⊆ ρ be two binary relations on S, then ρ|α will be the relation on S|ρ defined via
(x, y) ∈ ρ|α if and only if (∃b ∈ x, c ∈ y)(b, c) ∈ ρ. The relation Q|τ(Q) for a relation Q
will be denoted by σ(Q).
The following are known:
Prop 1.2. If Q is a quasi-order on S, then Q|τ(Q) is a partial order on S|τ(Q).
Prop 1.3. If R ∈ Ref(S), then R ∈ pτ(S) if and only if τ(R) ∈ EQ(S).
Prop 1.4. In general,
wτ(S) ⊆ sτ(S) ⊆ pτ(S).
Prop 1.5. If R ∈ pτ(S) ∩Ref(S), then the following are equivalent:
A1 ([a], [b]) ∈ R|τ(R) if and only if (a, b) ∈ R.
A2 R is semi-transitive.
In [17], it is proved that
Theorem 1.1. If R ∈ Ref(S), then the following are equivalent:
A3 R|τ(R) is a pseudo order on S|τ(R) and A1 holds.
A2 R is semi-transitive.
Note that Weak transitivity of [17] is proto-transitivity here. Ref(S), rτ(S), wτ(S),
pτ(S), EQ(S) will respectively denote the set of reflexive, transitive, weakly transitive,
proto transitive, and equivalence relations on the set S respectively. Clearly, wτ(S) ⊆
pτ(S).
Prop 1.6. ∀R ∈ Ref(S)(R ∈ pτ(S)↔ τ(R) ∈ EQ(S)).
Definition 1.3. A Partial Algebra P is a tuple of the form
〈P , f1, f2, . . . , fn, (r1, . . . , rn)〉
with P being a set, fi’s being partial function symbols of arity ri. The interpretation
of fi on the set P should be denoted by f
P
i , but the superscript will be dropped in this
monograph as the application contexts are simple enough. If predicate symbols enter into
the signature, then P is termed a Partial Algebraic System. (see [18, 19] for the basic
theory)
In a partial algebra, for term functions p, q,
p
ω
= q iff (∀x ∈ dom(p) ∩ dom(q))p(x) = q(x).
The weak strong equality is defined via,
p
ω∗
= q iff (∀x ∈ dom(p) = dom(q))p(x) = q(x).
For two terms s, t, s
ω
= t shall mean, if both sides are defined then the two terms are
equal (the quantification is implicit). s
ω∗
= t shall mean if either side is defined, then the
other is and the two sides are equal (the quantification is implicit).
1.2 Nelson Algebras
By a De Morgan lattice ∆ML we will mean an algebra of the form L = 〈L, ∨, ∧, c, 0, 1〉
with ∨, ∧ being distributive lattice operations and c satisfying
⋆ xcc = x ; (x ∨ y)c = xc ∧ yc ;
⋆ (x ≤ y ↔ yc ≤ xc) ; (x ∧ y)c = xc ∨ yc ;
It is possible to define a partial unary operation ⋆, via x⋆ =
∧
{x : x ≤ xc} on any
∆ML. If it is total, then the ∆ML is said to be complete. In a complete ∆ML L, we
have
⋆ x⋆  xc ; x⋆⋆ = x ;
⋆ (x ≤ y −→ y⋆ ≤ x⋆).
⋆ xc =
∨
{y : x⋆  y}.
A ∆ML is said to be a Kleene algebra if it satisfies x ∧ xc ≤ y ∨ yc. If L+ = {x ∨ xc :
x ∈ L} and L− = {x ∧ xc : x ∈ L}, then in a Kleene algebra we have
⋆ (L−)c = L+ is a filter and (L+)c = L− is an ideal.
⋆ (∀a, b ∈ L−) a ≤ bc; (∀a, b ∈ L+) ac ≤ b.
⋆ x ∈ L− if and only if x ≤ xc.
A Heyting algebra K, is a relatively pseudo-complemented lattice, that is (∀a, b) a ⇒
b =
∨
{x ; a ∧ x ≤ b} ∈ K.
A Quasi-Nelson algebra Q is a Kleene algebra that satisfies (∀a, b) a ⇒ (ac ∨ b) ∈ Q.
a⇒ (ac ∨ b) is abbreviated by a→ b below. Such an algebra satisfies all of the sentences
N1–N4:
x→ x = 1 (N1)
(xc ∨ y) ∧ (x→ y) = xc ∨ y (N2)
x ∧ (x→ y) = x ∧ (xc ∨ y) (N3)
x→ (y ∧ z) = (x→ y) ∧ (x→ z) (N4)
(x ∧ y)→ z = x→ (y → z). (N5)
A Nelson algebra is a quasi-Nelson algebra satisfying N5. A Nelson algebra can also be
defined directly as an algebra of the form 〈A,∨,∧,→, c, 0, 1〉 with 〈A,∨,∧, c, 0, 1〉 being
a Kleene algebra with the binary operation → satisfying N1–N5.
1.3 Granules and Granular Computing Paradigms
The idea of granular computing is as old as human evolution. Even in the available
information on earliest human habitations and dwellings, it is possible to identify a
primitive granular computing process (PGCP) at work. This can for example be seen
from the stone houses, dating to 3500 BCE, used in what is present-day Scotland. The
main features of this and other primitive versions of the paradigm may be seen to be
⋆ Problem requirements are not rigid.
⋆ Concept of granules may be vague.
⋆ Little effort on formalization right up to approximately the middle of the previous
century.
⋆ Scope of abstraction is very limited.
⋆ Concept of granules may be concrete or abstract (relative all materialist view-
points).
The precision based granular computing paradigm, traceable to Moore and Shannon’s
paper [20], will be referred to as the classical granular computing paradigm CGCP is
usually understood as the granular computing paradigm (The reader may note that the
idea is vaguely present in [21]). The distinct terminology would be useful to keep track of
the differences with other paradigms. CGCP has since been adapted to fuzzy and rough
set theories in different ways.
Granules may be assumed to subsume the concept of information granules – information
at some level of precision. In granular approaches to both rough and fuzzy sets, we
are usually concerned with such types of granules. Some of the fragments involved in
applying CGCP may be:
⋆ Paradigm Fragment-1: Granules can exist at different levels of precision.
⋆ Paradigm Fragment-2: Among the many precision levels, choose a precision level
at which the problem at hand is solved.
⋆ Paradigm Fragment-3: Granulations (granules at specific levels or processes) form
a hierarchy (later development).
⋆ Paradigm Fragment-4: It is possible to easily switch between precision levels.
⋆ Paradigm Fragment-5: The problem under investigation may be represented by the
hierarchy of multiple levels of granulations.
The different stages of development of granular computing paradigms are as in the fol-
lowing:
⋆ Classical Primitive Paradigm till middle of previous century.
⋆ CGCP: Since Shannon’s information theory
⋆ CGCP in fuzzy set theory. It is natural for most real-valued types of fuzzy sets,
but even in such domains unsatisfactory results are normal. Type-2 fuzzy sets have
an advantage over type-1 fuzzy sets in handling data relating to emotion words, for
example, but still far from satisfactory. For one thing linguistic hedges have little
to do with numbers. A useful reference would be [22].
⋆ For a long period (up to 2008 or so), the adaptation of CGCP for RST has been
based solely on precision and related philosophical aspects. The adaptation is
described for example in [23]. In the same paper the hierarchical structure of
granulations is also stressed. This and many later papers on CGCP (like [24]) in
rough sets speak of structure of granulations.
⋆ Some Papers with explicit reference to multiple types of granules from a semantic
viewpoint include [4, 25–28].
⋆ The axiomatic approach to granularity initiated in [4] has been developed by the
present author in the direction of contamination reduction in [5]. From the order-
theoretic/algebraic point of view, the deviation is in a very new direction relative
the precision-based paradigm. The paradigm shift includes a new approach to
measures.
There are other adaptations of CGCP to soft computing like [29] that we will not consider.
Unless the underlying language is restricted, granulations can bear upon the theory with
unlimited diversity. Thus for example in classical RST, we can take any of the following
as granulations: collection of equivalence classes, complements of equivalence classes,
other partitions on the universal set S, other partition in S, set of finite subsets of S
and set of finite subsets of S of cardinality greater than 2. This is also among the many
motivations for the axiomatic approach.
A formal simplified version of the the axiomatic approach to granules is in [9]. The ax-
iomatic theory is capable of handling most contexts and is intended to permit relaxation
of set-theoretic axioms at a later stage. The axioms are considered in the framework
of Rough Y-Systems (RYS) that maybe seen as a generalized form of abstract approxi-
mation spaces [30] and approximation framework [31]. It includes relation-based RST,
cover-based RST and more. These structures are provided with enough structure so that
a classical semantic domain (Meta-C) and at least one rough semantic domain (called
Meta-R) of roughly equivalent objects along with admissible operations and predicates
are associable. But the exact way of association is not something absolute as there is no
real end to recursive approximation processes of objects.
In the present monograph we will stick to successor, predecessor and related granules
generated by elements and will avoid the precision based paradigm.
2 Approximations and Definite Elements in PRAX
Definition 2.1. By a Proto Approximation Space S (PRAS for short), we will mean a
pair of the form 〈S, R〉 with S being a set and R being a proto-transitive relation on it. If
R is also reflexive, then it will be called a Reflexive Proto Approximation Space (PRAX)
for short). S may be infinite.
If S is a PRAX or a PRAS, then we will respectively denote successor neighborhoods,
inverted successor or predecessor neighborhoods and symmetrized successor neighborhoods
generated by an element x ∈ S as follows:
[x] = {y; Ryx}.
[x]i = {y; Rxy}.
[x]o = {y; Ryx & Rxy}.
Taking these as granules, the associated granulations will be denoted by G = {[x] :
x ∈ S}, Gi and Go respectively. In all that follows S will be a PRAX unless indicated
otherwise.
Definition 2.2. Definable approximations on S include (A ⊆ S):
Au =
⋃
[x]∩A 6=∅
[x]. (Upper Proto)
Al =
⋃
[x]⊆A
[x]. (Lower Proto)
Auo =
⋃
[x]o∩A 6=∅
[x]o. (Symmetrized Upper Proto)
Alo =
⋃
[x]o⊆A
[x]o. (Symmetrized Lower Proto)
Au+ = {x : [x] ∩A 6= ∅}. (Point-wise Upper)
Al+ = {x : [x] ⊆ A} . (Point-wise Lower)
Persistent Example 2.1. In the context of our example 1.1, [x] is the set of allies x,
while [x]o is the set of comrades of x. A
l is the union of the set of all allies of at least
one of of the members of A if they are all in A. Au is the union of the set of all allies
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of persons having at least one ally in A. Al+ is the set of all those persons in A all of
whose allies are within A. Au+ is the set of all those persons having allies in A.
Definition 2.3. If A ⊆ S is an arbitrary subset of a PRAX or a PRAS S, then
Aux =
⋃
[x]o∩A 6=∅
[x]. (2.1)
Alx =
⋃
[x]o⊆A
[x]. (2.2)
Au∗ =
⋃
{[x] : [x] ∩A 6= ∅& (∃y)([x], [y]) ∈ σ(R), (x, y) ∈ R, x 6= y, [y] ⊆ A}. (2.3)
Al∗ =
⋃
{[x] : [x] ⊆ A & (∃y)(([x], [y]) ∈ σ(R), x 6= y, [y] ⊆ A)}. (2.4)
The following inverted approximations are also of relevance as they provide Galois con-
nections in case of point-wise approximations (see [32]) under particular assumptions.
Our main approximations of interest will be l, u, lo, uo.
Definition 2.4. In the context of the above definition, the following will be referred to
as inverted approximations:
Aui =
⋃
[x]i∩A 6=∅
[x]i
Ali =
⋃
[x]i⊆A
[x]i
A△ = {x : [x]i ∩A 6= ∅}
A▽ = {x : [x]i ⊆ A}
Prop 2.1. In a PRAX S and for a subset A ⊆ S, all of the following hold:
⋆ (∀x) [x]o ⊆ [x]
⋆ It is possible that Al 6= Al+ and in general, Al ‖ Alo.
Proof. The proof of the first two parts are easy. For the third, we chase the argument
up to a trivial counter example (see the following chapter).⋃
[x]⊆A
[x] ⊆
⋃
[x]o⊆A
[x] ⊇
⋃
[x]o⊆A
[x]o
⋃
[x]o⊆A
[x]o ⊇
⋃
[x]⊆A
[x]o ⊆
⋃
[x]⊆A
[x].
Prop 2.2. For any subset A of S,
Auo ⊆ Au.
Proof. Since [x]o ∩A 6= ∅, therefore
Auo =
⋃
[x]o∩A 6=∅
[x]o ⊆
⋃
[x]∩A 6=∅
[x]o ⊆ A
uo =
⋃
[x]∩A 6=∅
[x] = Au.
Definition 2.5. If X is an approximation operator, then by a X-definite element, we will
mean a subset A satisfying AX = A. The set of all X-definite elements will be denoted
by δX(S), while the set of X and Y -definite elements (Y being another approximation
operator) will be denoted by δXY (S). In particular, we will speak of lower proto-definite,
upper proto definite and proto-definite elements (those that are both lower and upper
proto-definite).
Theorem 2.1. In a PRAX S, the following hold:
⋆ δu(S) ⊆ δuo(S), but δlo(S) = δuo(S) and δu(S) is a complete sublattice of ℘(S)
with respect to inclusion.
⋆ δl(S) ‖ δlo(S) in general. (‖ means is not comparable.)
⋆ It is possible that δu * δuo .
Proof. ⋆ As R is reflexive, if A, B are upper proto definite, then A ∪ B and A ∩ B
are both upper proto definite. So δu(S) is a complete sublattice of ℘(S).
⋆ If A ∈ δu, then (∀x ∈ A)[x] ⊆ A and (∀x ∈ A
c)[x] ∩A = ∅.
⋆ So (∀x ∈ Ac) [x]o ∩A = ∅. But as A ⊆ A
uo is necessary, we must have A ∈ δuo .
Au+, Al+ have relatively been more commonly used in the literature and have also been
the only kind of approximation studied in [32] for example (the inverse relation is also
considered from the same perspective).
Definition 2.6. A subset B ⊆ Al+ will be said to be skeleton of A if and only if⋃
x∈B
[x] = Al,
and the set skeletons of A will be denoted by sk(A).
The skeleton of a set A is important because it relates all three classes of approximations.
Theorem 2.2. In the context of the above definition, we have
⋆ sk(A) is partially ordered by inclusion with greatest element Al+.
⋆ sk(A) has a set of minimal elements skm(S).
⋆ sk(A) = sk(Al)
⋆ sk(A) = sk(B) ↔ Al = Bl & Al+ = Bl+.
⋆ If B ∈ sk(A), then Al ⊆ Bu.
⋆ If ∩sk(A) = B, then Alo ∩
⋃
x∈B[x] = ∅.
Proof. Much of the proof is implicit in other results proved earlier in this chapter.
⋆ If x ∈ Al \ Al+, then [x] * Al and many subsets B of Al+ are in sk(A). If
B ⊂ K ⊂ Al+ and B ∈ sk(A), then K ∈ sk(A). Further we have a minimal
elements in the inclusion order (even if A is infinite) by the induced properties of
inclusion in ℘(S).
⋆ has been proved above.
⋆ More generally, if we have Al ⊆ B ⊆ A, then Bl = Al. So sk(A) = sk(Al).
⋆ Follows from definition.
⋆ If B ∈ sk(A), then Al = Bl ⊆ Bu.
Theorem 2.3. All of the following hold in PRAX:
⋆ (∀A)Acl+ = Au+c, Acu+ = Al+c - that is l+ and u+ are mutually dual
⋆ u+ (l+ resp.) is a monotone ∨- (complete ∧- resp.) morphism.
⋆ ∂(A) = ∂(Ac), where ∂ stands for the boundary operator.
⋆ ℑ(u+) (the image of u+) is an interior system while ℑ(l+) is a closure system.
⋆ ℑ(u+) and ℑ(l+) are dually isomorphic lattices.
Theorem 2.4. In a PRAX, (∀A ∈ ℘(S))Al+ ⊆ Al, Au+ ⊆ Au and all of the following
hold.
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))All = Al & Au ⊆ Auu. (Bi)
(∀A,B ∈ ℘(S))Al ∪Bl ⊆ (A ∪B)l. (l-Cup)
(∀A,B ∈ ℘(S)) (A ∩B)l ⊆ Al ∩Bl. (l-Cap)
(∀A,B ∈ ℘(S)) (A ∪B)u = Au ∪Bu. (u-Cup)
(∀A,B ∈ ℘(S)) (A ∩B)u ⊆ Au ∩Bu. (u-Cap)
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))Alc ⊆ Acu. (Dual)
Proof. l-Cup For any A,B ∈ ℘S, x ∈ (A ∪B)l
⇔ (∃y ∈ (A ∪B))x ∈ [y] ⊆ A ∪B.
⇔ (∃y ∈ A)x ∈ [y] ⊆ A ∪B or (∃y ∈ B)x ∈ [y] ⊆ A ∪B.
⇔ (∃y ∈ A)x ∈ [y] ⊆ A or (∃y ∈ A)x ∈ [y] ⊆ B or (∃y ∈ B)x ∈ [y] ⊆ A or
(∃y ∈ B)x ∈ [y] ⊆ B - this is implied by x ∈ Al ∪Bl.
l-Cap For any A,B ∈ ℘S, x ∈ (A ∩B)l
⇔ x ∈ A ∩B
⇔ (∃y ∈ A ∩B)x ∈ [y] ⊆ A ∩B and x ∈ A, x ∈ B
⇔ (∃y ∈ A)x ∈ [y] ⊆ A and (∃y ∈ B)x ∈ [y] ⊆ B - Clearly this statement
implies x ∈ Al & x ∈ Bl, but the converse is not true in general.
u-Cup x ∈ (A ∪B)u
⇔ x ∈
⋃
[y]∩(A∪B)6=∅[y]
⇔ x ∈
⋃
([y]∩A)∪([y]∩B)6=∅
⇔ x ∈
⋃
[y]∩A 6=∅[y] or x ∈
⋃
[y]∩B 6=∅[y]
⇔ x ∈ Au ∪Bu.
u-Cap By monotonicity, (A ∩B) ⊆ Au and (A ∩B) ⊆ Bu, so (A ∩B)u ⊆ Au ∩Bu.
Dual If z ∈ Alc, then z ∈ [x]c for all [x] ⊆ A and either, z ∈ A \ Al or z ∈ Ac. If z ∈ Ac
then z ∈ Acu. If z ∈ A \Al and z 6= Acu\A
c
then [z]∩Ac = ∅. But this contradicts
z /∈ Acu \Ac. So (∀A ∈ ℘(S))Alc ⊆ Acu.
Theorem 2.5. In a PRAX S, all of the following hold:
(∀A,B ∈ ℘(S)) (A ∩B)l+ = Al+ ∩Bl+. (2.5)
(∀A,B ∈ ℘(S))Al+ ∪Bl+ ⊆ (A ∪B)l+. (2.6)
(∀A ∈ ℘(S)) (Al+)c = (Ac)u+ & Al+ ⊆ Alo . (2.7)
Proof. 1. x ∈ (A ∩B)l+
⇔ [x] ⊆ A ∩B
⇔ [x] ⊆ A and [x] ⊆ B
⇔ x ∈ xAl+ and x ∈ Bl+.
2. x ∈ Al+ ∪Bl+
⇔ [x] ⊆ Al+ or [x] ⊆ Bl+
⇔ [x] ⊆ A or [x] ⊆ B
⇒ [x] ⊆ A ∪B ⇔ x ∈ (A ∪B)l+.
3. z ∈ Al+c
⇔ z /∈ Al+
⇔ [z] * A
⇔ z ∩Ac 6= ∅
Theorem 2.6. If u+, l+ are treated as self maps on the power-set ℘(S), S being a
PRAX or a PRAS then all of the following hold:
⋆ (∀x)xcl+ = xu+c, xcu+ = xl+c - that is l+ and u+ are mutually dual
⋆ l+, u+ are monotone.
⋆ l+ is a complete ∧-morphism, while u+ is a ∨-morphism.
⋆ ∂(x) = ∂(xc), where partial stands for the boundary operator.
⋆ ℑ(u+) is an interior system while ℑ(l+) is a closure system.
⋆ ℑ(u+) and ℑ(l+) are dually isomorphic lattices.
Theorem 2.7.
In a PRAX S, (∀A ⊆ S)Al+ ⊆ Al, Au+ ⊆ Au.
Proof. ⋆ If x ∈ Al+, then [x] ⊆ A and so [x] ⊆ Al, x ∈ Al.
⋆ If x ∈ Al, then (∃y ∈ A)[y] ⊆ A, Rxy. But it is possible that [x] * A, therefore it
is possible that x /∈ Al+ and Al * Al+.
⋆ If x ∈ Au+, then [x] ∩A 6= ∅, so x ∈ Au.
⋆ So Au+ ⊆ Au.
⋆ Note that x ∈ Au, if and only if (∃z ∈ S)x ∈ [z], [z] ∩ A 6= ∅, but this does not
imply x ∈ Au+.
Theorem 2.8. In a PRAX S, all of the following hold:
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))Al+ ⊆ Alo . (2.8)
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))Auo ⊆ Au+. (2.9)
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))Alc ⊆ Acu. (2.10)
Proof. 1. ⋆ If x ∈ Al+, then [x] ⊆ A.
⋆ But as [x]o ⊆ [x], A
l+ ⊆ Alo .
2. This follows easily from definitions.
3. ⋆ If z ∈ Alc, then z ∈ [x]c for all [x] ⊆ A and either, z ∈ A \ Al or z ∈ Ac.
⋆ If z ∈ Ac then z ∈ Acu.
⋆ If z ∈ A \Al and z 6= Acu\A
c
then [z] ∩Ac = ∅.
⋆ But this contradicts z /∈ Acu \Ac.
⋆ So (∀A ∈ ℘(S))Alc ⊆ Acu.
From the above, we have the following relation between approximations in general
(Au+ −→ Au should be read as Au+ is included in Au):
Al+ A
Al
Alo
Auo Au+ Au
Figure 2.1: Relationship Between Approximations
If a relation R is purely reflexive and not proto-transitive on a set S, then the relation
τ(R) = R∩R−1 will not be an equivalence and for a A ⊂ S, it is possible that Auol ⊆ A
or Auol ‖ A or A ⊆ Auol.
3 Motivation and Examples
Generalized transitive relations occur frequently in general information systems, but are
often not recognized as such and there is hope for improved semantics and KI relative the
situation for purely reflexive relation based RST. Not all of the definable approximations
have been investigated in even closely related structures of general RST. Contamination-
free semantics [5] for the contexts are also not known. Finally these relate to RYS and
variants. A proper characterization of roughly equal (requal) objects is also motivated
by [5].
3.1 Abstract Example
Let § = {a, b, c, e, f, g, h, l, n} and let R be a binary relation on it defined via
R = {(a, a), (l, l), (n, n), (n, h), (h, n), (l, n), (g, c), (c, g)
(g, l), (b, g), (g, b), (h, g), (a, b), (b, c), (h, a), (a, c)}.
Then 〈S, R〉 is a PRAS.
If P is the reflexive closure of R (that is P = R ∪ ∆S), then 〈S, P 〉 is a PRAX. The
successor neighborhoods associated with different elements of S are as follows (E is a
variable taking values in S):
Table 3.1: Successor Neighborhoods
E a b c g e f h l n
[E] {a, h} {b, c, g} {b, c, g} {b, c, g, h} {e} {f} {h, n} {l, g} {n, l, g, h}
[E]o {a} {b, c, g} {b, c, g} {b, c, g} {e} {f} {h, n} {l} {n, h}
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If A = {a, h, f},
then Al = {a, h, f},
Alo = {a, f} and Alo ⊂ Al.
If F = {l},
then F l = ∅, F lo = F
and F l ⊂ F lo .
Now let Z = N ∪ S ∪X, where N is the set of naturals, X is the set of elements of the
infinite sequences {xi}, {yj}. Let Q be a relation on Z such that
Q ∩ S2 = P, (3.1)
Q ∩N2 is some equivalence, (3.2)
(∀i ∈ N)(i, x3i+1), (x2i, i), (xi, xi+1), (yi, yi+1) ∈ Q. (3.3)
Q is then a proto-transitive relation. For any i ∈ N , let Pi = {yk : k 6= 2j & k <
i} ∪ {x2j : 2j < i} - this will be used in later chapters. The extension of the example to
involve nets and densely ordered subsets is standard.
3.2 Caste Hierarchies and Interaction
The caste system and religion are among the deep-seated evils of Indian society that
often cut across socio-economic classes and level of education. For the formulation of
strategies aimed at large groups of people towards the elimination of such evils it would
be fruitful to study interaction of people belonging to different castes and religions on
different social fronts.
Most of these castes would have multiple subcaste hierarchies in addition. Social interac-
tions are necessarily constrained by their type and untouchability perception. If x, y are
two castes, then with respect to a possible social interaction α, people belonging to x will
either regard people belonging to y as untouchable or otherwise. As the universality is so
total, it is possible to write Uαxy to mean that y is untouchable for x for the interaction
α. Usually this is a asymmetric relation and y would be perceived as a lower caste by
members of x and many others.
Other predicates will of course be involved in deciding on the possibility of the social
interaction, but if Uαxy then the interaction is forbidden relative x. If α is "context
of possible marriage", then the complementary relation (Cα say) is a reflexive proto-
transitive relation. For various other modes of interaction similar relations may be found.
In devising remedial educational programmes targeted at mixed groups, it would be
important to understand approximate perceptions of the group and the semantics of
PRAX would be very relevant.
3.3 Compatibility Prediction Models
When we want to predict compatibility among individuals or objects, then the following
model can be used. Specific examples include situations involving data from dating sites
like OK-Cupid.
Let one woman be defined by a sequence of sets of features a1, . . . , an at different tem-
poral instants and another woman by b1, . . . , bn. Let ω(ai, bi) be the set of features that
are desired by ai, but missing in bi. Let ρ be an equivalence relation on a subset K of
S – the set of all features, that determines the classical rough approximations lρ, uρ on
℘(K).
Let (a, b) ∈ R if and only if (ω(an, bn)
lρ is small (for example, that can mean being an
atom of ℘(K)). The predicate R is intended to convey may like to be related. In dating
sites, this is understood in terms of profile matches: if a woman’s profile matches another
woman’s and conversely and similarly with another woman’s, then the other two woman
are assumed to be mutually compatible.
Prop 3.1. R is a proto-transitive relation and 〈S, R〉 is a PRAS.
Proof. Obviously R need not be reflexive or symmetric in general.
If (a, b), (b, c), (b, a), (c, b) ∈ R, then (a, c), (c, a) ∈ R is a reasonable rule.
So we have a concrete example of a PRAS that is suggestive of many more practical
contexts.
3.4 Indeterminate Information System Perspective
It is easy to derive PRAX from population census, medical, gender studies and other
databases and these correspond to information systems. We make the connection clearer
through this example.
If our problem is to classify a specific population O, for a purpose based on scientific
data on sex, gender continuum, sexual orientation and other factors, then our data base
would be an indeterminate information system of the form
I = 〈O, At, {Va : a ∈ At}, {ϕa : a ∈ At}〉 ,
where At is a set of attributes, Va a set of possible values corresponding to the attribute
a and ϕa : O 7−→ ℘(Va) the valuation function. Sex is determined by many attributes
corresponding to hormones, brain structure, karyotypes, brain configuration, anatomy,
clinical sex etc. We can associate free/bound values of over six hormones, the values of
which vary widely over populations. Suppose we are interested in a subset of attributes
for which the inclusion/ordering of values (corresponding to any one of the attributes
in the subset) of an object in another is relevant. We may, for example, be interested
in patterns in sexual compatibility/relationships corresponding to such inclusions. This
relation is proto-transitive. Formally for a B ⊆ At, if we let (x, y) ∈ ρB if and only if
(∃a ∈ B)ϕax ⊆ ϕay, then ρB is often proto-transitive via another predicate on B.
4 Algebras of Rough Definite Elements
In this chapter we prove key results on the fine structure of definite elements.
Theorem 4.1. On the set of proto definite elements δlu(S) of a PRAX S, we can define
the following:
x ∧ y
∆
= x ∩ y. (4.1)
x ∨ y
∆
= x ∪ y. (4.2)
0
∆
= ∅. (4.3)
1
∆
= S. (4.4)
xc
∆
= S \ x. (4.5)
Proof. We need to show that the operations are well defined. Suppose x, y are proto-
definite elements, then
1.
(x ∩ y)u ⊆ xu ∩ yu = x ∩ y.
(x ∩ y)l = (xu ∩ yu)l = (x ∩ y)ul = (x ∩ y)u = x ∩ y.
Since aul = au for any a.
2.
(x ∪ y)u = x ∪ y = xl ∪ yl ⊆ (x ∪ y)l.
3. 0
∆
= ∅ is obviously well defined.
4. Obvious.
5. Suppose A ∈ δlu(S), then (∀z ∈ A
c) [z] ∩ A = ∅ is essential, else [z] would be in
Au. This means [z] ⊆ Ac and so Ac = Acl. If there exists a a ∈ A such that
[a] ∩Ac 6= ∅, then [a] ⊆ Au = A. So Ac ∈ δlu(S).
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Theorem 4.2. The algebra δproto(S) = 〈δlu(S),∨,∧, c, 0, 1〉 is a Boolean lattice.
Proof. Follows from the previous theorem. The lattice order can be defined via, x ≤ y if
and only if x ∪ y = y and x ∩ y = x.
5 The Representation of Roughly Objects
The representation of roughly equal elements in terms of definite elements are well known
in case of classical rough set theory. In case of more general spaces including tolerance
spaces [5], most authors have been concerned with describing the interaction of rough
approximations of different types and not of the interaction of roughly equal objects.
Higher order approaches, developed by the present author as in [4] for bitten approxi-
mation spaces, permit constructs over sets of roughly equal objects. In the light of the
contamination problem [4, 5], it would be an improvement to describe without higher
order constructs. In this chapter a new method of representing roughly equal elements
based on expanding concepts of definite elements is developed.
Definition 5.1. On ℘(S), we can define the following relations:
A  B if and only if Al ⊆ Bl & Au ⊆ Bu. (Rough Inclusion)
A ≈ B if and only if A  B & B  A. (Rough Equality)
Prop 5.1. The relation  defined on ℘(S) is a bounded partial order and ≈ is an equiv-
alence. The quotient ℘(S)| ≈ will be said to be the set of roughly equivalent objects.
Definition 5.2. A subset A of ℘(S) will be said to a set of roughly equal elements if
and only if
(∀x, y ∈ A)xl = yl & xu = yu.
It will be said to be full if no other subset properly including A has the property.
Relative the situation for a general RYS, we have
Theorem 5.1 (Meta-Theorem). In a PRAX S, full set of roughly equal elements is
necessarily a union of intervals in ℘(S).
Definition 5.3. A non-empty set of non singleton subsets α = {x : x ⊆ ℘(S)} will be
said to be a upper broom if and only if all of the following hold:
(∀x, y ∈ α)xu = yu.
(∀x, y ∈ α)x ‖ y.
If α ⊂ β, then β fails to satisfy at least one of the above two conditions.
The set of upper brooms of S will be denoted by ⋔ (S).
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Definition 5.4. A non-empty set of non singleton subsets α = {x : x ⊆ ℘(S)} will be
said to be a lower broom if and only if all of the following hold:
(∀x, y ∈ α)xl = yl 6= x. (5.1)
(∀x, y ∈ α)x ‖ y. (5.2)
If β ⊂ α& Card(β) ≥ 2, then β fails to satisfy condition (1) or (2). (5.3)
The set of lower brooms of S will be denoted by ψ(S).
Prop 5.2. If x ∈ δlu(S) then {x} /∈⋔ (S) and {x} /∈ ψ(S).
In the next definition, the concept of union of intervals in a partially ordered set is
modified in a way for use with specific types of objects.
Definition 5.5. By a bruinval, we will mean a subset of ℘(S) of one of the following
forms:
⋆ Bruinval-0: Intervals of the form (x, y), [x, y), [x, x], (x, y] for x, y ∈ ℘(S).
⋆ Open Bruinvals: Sets of the form [x, α) = {z : x ≤ z < b & b ∈ α}, (x, α] =
{z : x < z ≤ b & b ∈ α} and (x, α) = {z : x < z < b , b ∈ α} for α ∈ ℘(℘(S)).
⋆ Closed Bruinvals: Sets of the form [x, α] = {z : x ≤ z ≤ b & b ∈ α} for
α ∈ ℘(℘(S)).
⋆ Closed Set Bruinvals: Sets of the form [α, β] = {z : x ≤ z ≤ y & x ∈ α& y ∈ β}
for α, β ∈ ℘(℘(S))
⋆ Open Set Bruinvals: Sets of the form (α, β) = {z : x < z < y , x ∈ α & y ∈ β}
for α, β ∈ ℘(℘(S)).
⋆ Semi-Closed Set Bruinvals: Sets of the form [[α, β]] defined as follows: α = α1∪α2,
β = β1∪β2 and [[α, β]] = (α1, β1)∪ [α2, β2]∪ (α1, β2]∪ [α2, β1) for α, β ∈ ℘(℘(S)).
In the example of the second chapter, the representation of the rough object (P li , P
u
i )
requires set bruinvals.
Prop 5.3. If S is a PRAX, then a set of the form [x, y] with x, y ∈ δlu(S) will be a set
of roughly equal subsets of S if and only if x = y.
Prop 5.4. A bruinval-0 of the form (x, y) is a full set of roughly equal elements if
⋆ x, y ∈ δlu(S),
⋆ x is covered by y in the order on δlu(S).
Prop 5.5. If x, y ∈ δlu(S) then sets of the form [x, y), (x, y] cannot be a non-empty set
of roughly equal elements, while those of the form [x, y] can be if and only if x = y.
Prop 5.6. A bruinval-0 of the form [x, y) is a full set of roughly equal elements if
⋆ xl, yu ∈ δlu(S), x
l = yl and xu = yu,
⋆ xl is covered by yu in δlu(S) and
⋆ x \ (xl) and yu \ y are singletons
Remark 5.1. In the above proposition the condition xl, yu ∈ δlu(S), is not necessary.
Theorem 5.2. If a bruinval-0 of the form [x, y] satisfies
xl = yl = x & xu = yu.
Card(yu \ y) = 1.
then [x, y] is a full set of roughly equal objects.
Proof. Under the conditions, if [x, y] is not a full set of roughly equal objects, then
there must exist at least one set h such that hl = x and hu = yu and h /∈ [x, y].
But this contradicts the order constraint xl ≤ h yu. Note that yu /∈ [x, y] under the
conditions.
Theorem 5.3. If a bruinval-0 of the form (x, y] satisfies
xl = yl = x & (∀z ∈ (x, y]) zu = yu,
Card(yu \ y) = 1.
then (x, y] is a full set of roughly equal objects, that does not intersect the full set [x, xu].
Proof. By monotonicity it follows that (x, y] is a full set of roughly equal objects. then
there must exist at least one set h such that hl = x and hu = yu and h /∈ [x, y].
But this contradicts the order constraint xl ≤ h yu. Note that yu /∈ [x, y] under the
conditions.
Theorem 5.4. A bruinval-0 of the form (xl, xu) is not always a set of roughly equal
elements, but will be so when xuu = xu. In the latter situation it will be full if [xl, xu) is
not full.
The above theorems essentially show that the description of rough objects depends on
too many types of sets and the order as well. Most of the considerations extend to other
types of bruinvals as is shown below and remain amenable.
Theorem 5.5. An open bruinval of the form (x, α) is a full set of roughly equal elements
if and only if
α ∈⋔ (S).
(∀y ∈ α)xl = yl, xu = yu
(∀z)(xl ⊆ z ⊂ x −→ zu ⊂ xu).
Proof. It is clear that for any y ∈ α, (x, y) is a convex interval and all elements in it have
same upper and lower approximations. The third condition ensures that [z, α) is not a
full set for any z ∈ [xl, x).
Definition 5.6. An element x ∈ ℘(S) will be said to be a weak upper critical element
relative z ⊂ x if and only if (∀y ∈ ℘(S)) (z = yl & x ⊂ y −→ xu ⊂ yu).
An element x ∈ ℘(S) will be said to be an upper critical element relative z ⊂ x if and
only if (∀v, y ∈ ℘(S)) (z = yl = vl & v ⊂ x ⊂ y −→ vu = xu ⊂ yu). Note that the
inclusion is strict.
An element a will be said to be bi-critical relative b if and only if (∀x, y ∈ ℘(S))(a ⊂
x ⊆ y ⊂ b −→ xu = yu & xl = yl & xu ⊂ bu & al ⊂ xl).
If x is an upper critical point relative z, then [z, x) or (z, x) is a set of roughly equivalent
elements.
Definition 5.7. An element x ∈ ℘(S) will be said to be an weak lower critical element
relative z ⊃ x if and only if (∀y ∈ ℘(S)) (z = yu & y ⊂ x −→ yl ⊂ xl).
An element x ∈ ℘(S) will be said to be an lower critical element relative z ⊃ x if and
only if (∀y, v ∈ ℘(S)) (z = yu = vu & y ⊂ x ⊂ v −→ yl ⊂ xl = vl).
An element x ∈ ℘(S) will be said to be an lower critical element if and only if (∀y ∈
℘(S)) (y ⊂ x −→ yl ⊂ xl) An element that is both lower and upper critical will be said
to be critical. The set of upper critical, lower critical and critical elements respectively
will be denoted by UC(S), LC(S) and CR(S).
Prop 5.7. In a PRAX, every upper definite subset is also upper critical, but the converse
need not hold.
The most important thing about the different lower and upper critical points is that they
help in determining full sets of roughly equal elements by determining the boundaries of
intervals in bruinvals of different types.
5.1 Types of Associated Sets
Because of reflexivity it might appear that lower approximations in PRAX and classical
RST are too similar at least in the perspective of lower definite objects. It is necessary
to classify subsets of a PRAX S, to see the differences relative the behavior of lower
approximations in classical RST. We will make use of this in some of the semantics as
well.
Definition 5.8. For each element x ∈ ℘(S) we can associate the following sets:
F0(x) = {y : (∃a ∈ x
c)Rya & y ∈ x} (Forward Looking)
F1(x) = {y : (∃a ∈ x
c)Rya &Rzy & z ∈ x} (1-Forward Looking)
π0(x) = {y : y ∈ x & (∃a ∈ x
c)Ray} (Progressive)
St(x) = {y : [y] ⊆ x & ¬(y ∈ F0(x))} (Stable)
Sym(x) = {y : y ∈ x & (∀z ∈ x)(Ryz ↔ Rzy)} (Relsym)
Forward looking set associated with a set x includes those elements not in x whose succes-
sor neighborhoods intersect x. Elements of the set may be said to be relatively forward
looking. Progressive set of x includes those elements of x whose successor neighborhoods
are not included in x. It is obvious that progressive elements are all elements of x \ xl.
Stable elements are those that are strongly within x and are not directly reachable in
any sense from outside. Sym(x) includes those elements in x which are symmetrically
related to all other elements within x.
Even though all these are important we cannot easily represent them in the rough domain.
Their approximations have the following properties:
Prop 5.8. In the above context, we have
(π0(x))
l = ∅ & (π0(x))
u ⊆ xu \ xl
(F0(x))
u ⊆ xu
St(x)l ⊆ xl & F0(x) = ∅ −→ St(x) = x
l+
Sym(x)u ⊆ xu & (Sym(x))l ⊆ xl.
Proof. Proof is fairly direct.

6 More on Representation of Rough Objects
We have already shown in the previous chapter that the representation of rough objects
by definite objects is not possible in a PRAX. So it is important to look at possibilities
based on other types of derived approximations. We do this and solve the problem right
up to representation theorems for the derived operators in this chapter.
Definition 6.1. If x ∈ ℘(S), then
⋆ Let Πo♥(x) = {y ; x ⊆ y & x
l = yl & yu ⊆ xuu}.
⋆ Form the set of maximal elements Π♥(x) of Π
o
♥(x) with respect to the inclusion
order.
⋆ Select a unique element χ(Π♥(x)) through a fixed choice function χ.
⋆ Form (χ(Π♥(x)))
u.
⋆ x♥χ = (χ(Π♥(x)))
u will be said to be the almost upper approximation of x relative
χ.
⋆ x♥χ will be abbreviated by x♥ when we work with fixed χ.
The choice function will be said to be regular if and only if (∀x, y) (x ⊆ y & xl = yl −→
χ(Π♥(x)) = χ(Π♥(y))). We will assume regularity unless specified otherwise in what
follows.
Definition 6.2. If x ∈ ℘(S), then
⋆ Let Πo♦(x) = {y ; x ⊆ y & x
l = yl}.
⋆ Form the set of maximal elements Π♦(x) of Π
o
♦(x) with respect to the inclusion
order.
⋆ Select a unique element χ(Π♦(x)) through a fixed choice function χ.
⋆ x♦χ = χ(Π♦(x)) will be said to be the lower limiter of x relative χ.
⋆ x♦χ will be abbreviated by x♦ when we work with fixed χ.
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Definition 6.3. If x ∈ ℘(S), then
⋆ Let Πo♭ (x) = {y ; y ⊆ x & x
u = yu}.
⋆ Form the set of maximal elements Π♭(x) of Π
o
♭ (x) with respect to the inclusion
order.
⋆ Select a unique element ξ(Π♭(x)) through a fixed choice function ξ.
⋆ x♭ξ = ξ(Π♭(x)) will be said to be the upper limiter of x relative χ.
⋆ x♭ξ will be abbreviated by x♭ when we work with fixed ξ.
Prop 6.1. In the context of the above definition, the almost upper approximation satisfies
all of the following:
(∀x)x ⊆ x♥ (Inclusion)
(∀x)x♥ ⊆ x♥♥ (Non-Idempotence)
(∀x y) (x ⊆ y ⊆ x♥ −→ x♥ ⊆ y♥) (Cautious Monotony)
(∀x)xu ⊆ x♥ (Supra Pseudo Classicality)
S♥ = S (Top.)
Proof. ⋆ Inclusion: Follows from the construction. If we have one element granules
or successor neighborhoods included in x, then these must be in the lower approxi-
mation. If a granule y is not included in x, but intersects it in f , then it is possible
to include f in each of Π♥(x). So inclusion follows.
⋆ Non-Idempotence: The reverse inclusion does not happen as xu ⊆ xuu.
⋆ Cautious monotony: It is clear that monotony can fail in general because of the
choice aspect, but if we have x ⊆ y ⊆ x♥, then xl ⊆ yl and y♥ has to be equal to
x♥ or include more granules because of regularity of the choice function.
⋆ Supra Pseudo Classicality: We use the adjective pseudo because u is not a classical
consequence operator. In the construction of x♥, we select from super-sets of xl that
can generate maximal upper approximations and take the upper approximation of
the selected. So that includes xu in general.
We have used the names of conditions in relation to the standard terminology used in
non-monotonic reasoning. The upper approximation operator u is similar to classical
consequence operator, but lacks idempotence. So the fourth property has been termed
as supra pseudo classicality as opposed to supra classicality. This means we are in a
more general domain of reasoning relative the domains of [33].
Theorem 6.1. In the context of 6.1, we have the following additional properties:
(∀x)x♥ ⊆ xu♥ (Sub Left Absorption)
(∀x)x♥ ⊆ x♥u (Sub Right Absorption)
(∀x, y) (xu = yu 9 x♥ = y♥) (No Left Logical Equivalence)
(∀x, y) (x♥ = y♥ 9 xl = yl) (No Jump Equivalence)
(∀x, y, z) (x ⊆ y♥ & z ⊆ xu 9 z ⊆ y♥) (No Weakening)
(∀x, y) (x ⊆ y ⊆ xu 9 x♥ = y♥) (No subclassical cumulativity)
(∀x, y)x♥ ∩ y♥ ⊆ (xu ∩ yu)♥ (Distributivity)
(∀x, y, z) (x ∪ z)♥ ∩ (y ∪ z)♥ ⊆ (z ∪ (xu ∩ yu))♥ (Weak Distributivity)
(∀x, y, z) (x ∪ y)♥ ∩ (x ∪ z)♥ ⊆ (x ∪ (y ⊕ z))♥ (Disjunction in Antecedent)
(∀x, y) (x ∪ y)♥ ∩ (x ∪ yc)♥ ⊆ x♥ (Proof by Cases)
If y ⊆ (x ∪ z)♥, then x =⇒ y ⊆ z♥ (Conditionalization.)
Proof. Sub Left Absorption For any x, x♥ is the upper approximation of a maximal
subset y containing x such that xl = yl and xu♥ is the upper approximation of a
maximal subset z containing xu such that xul = xu = zl. Since, xl ⊆ xul and
x ⊆ xu, so x♥ ⊆ xu♥ follows.
Sub Right Absorption Follows from the properties of u.
No Left Logical Equivalence Two subsets x, y can have unequal lower approximations
and equal upper approximations and so the implication does not hold in general.
 should be treated as an abbreviation for in general.
No Jump Equivalence The reason is similar to that of the previous negative result.
No weakening In general if x ⊆ y♥ & z ⊆ xu, then it is possible that xu ⊆ y♥ or
y♥ ⊆ xu. So we cannot be sure about z ⊆ y♥.
No Subclassical Cumulativity If x ⊆ y ⊆ xu, then xl ⊆ yl in general and so elements
of Π♥(x) may be included in Π♥(y), the two may be unequal and we may not be
able to use a uniform choice function on them. So we need not have x♥ = y♥.
Distributivity If z ∈ x♥ ∩ y♥, then z ∈ (χ(Π♥(x)))
u and z ∈ (χ(Π♥(y)))
u. So if z ∈ xl
and z ∈ yl, then z ∈ (xu ∩ yu)♥. Since in general, (a ∩ b)u ⊆ au ∩ bu and
(au ∩ bu)l = (au ∩ bu), we have the required inclusion.
(∀x, y, z) (x ∪ z)♥ ∩ (y ∪ z)♥ ⊆ (z ∪ (xu ∩ yu))♥ (Weak Distributivity)
(∀x, y, z) (x ∪ y)♥ ∩ (x ∪ z)♥ ⊆ (x ∪ (y ⊕ z))♥ (Disjunction in Antecedent)
(∀x, y) (x ∪ y)♥ ∩ (x ∪ yc)♥ ⊆ x♥ (Proof by Cases)
If y ⊆ (x ∪ z)♥, then x =⇒ y ⊆ z♥ (Conditionalization.)
Prop 6.2.
(∀x, y)(x♦ = y♦ −→ xl = yl;)
(∀x, y)(x♭ = y♭ −→ xu = yu.)
Discussion:
In non monotonic reasoning, if C is any consequence operator : ℘(S) 7−→ ℘(S), then
the following named properties of crucial importance in semantics (in whatever sense,
[33, 34]):
A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A) −→ C(B) ⊆ C(A) (Cut)
A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A) −→ C(B) = C(A) (Cumulativity)
x ⊆ y ⊆ xu −→ x♥ = y♥ (subclassical subcumulativity)
Prop 6.3. In the context of the above definition, the lower limiter satisfies all of the
following:
(∀x)x ⊆ x♦ (Inclusion)
(∀x)x♦♦ = x♦ (Idempotence)
(∀x y) (x ⊆ y ⊆ x♦ −→ x♦ = y♦) (Cumulativity)
(∀x)xu ⊆ x♦ (Upper Inclusion)
S♦ = S (Top)
(∀x y) (x ⊆ y ⊆ x♦ −→ x♦ = y♦) (Cumulativity)
The above proposition means that the upper limiter corresponds to ways of reasoning in
a stable way in the sense that the aggregation of conclusions does not affect inferential
power or cut-like amplification.
We prove a limited concrete representation theorem for operators like ♥ in special cases
and ♦. The representation theorem is valid for similar operators in non-monotonic
reasoning. The representation theorem permits us to identify cover based formulations
of PRAX.
Definition 6.4. A collection of sets S will be said to be a closure system of a type as
per the following conditions:
(∀H ⊆ S) ∩H ∈ S. (Closure System)
(∀H ⊆ S) (∩H)u ∈ S. (U-Closure System)
(∀H ⊆ S) (∩H)l ∈ S. (L-Closure System)
(∀H ⊆ S) (∩H)l, (∩H)u ∈ S. (LU-Closure System)
(∃0,⊤ ∈ S)(∀X ∈ S) 0 ⊆ X ⊆ ⊤ . (Bounded)
Prop 6.4. In a PRAX S, the set U(S) = {xu; x ∈ ℘(S)} is not a bounded U-closure
system.
Prop 6.5.
(∀x)x♥u ⊆ xu♥.
Proof. Because xl ⊆ xu, an evaluation of possible granules involved in the construction
of x♥u and xu♥ proves the result.
Theorem 6.2. In a PRAX S, the set ♥(S) = {x♥; x ∈ ℘(S)} is a bounded LU-closure
system if the choice operation is regular.
Proof. ⋆ x♥ is the upper approximation of a specific y containing x that is maximal
subject to xl = yl.
⋆ x♥u is the upper approximation of the upper approximation of a specific y contain-
ing x that is maximal subject to xl = yl and its upper approximation.
⋆ Clearly,
(χ(Π♥(x)) ∩ χ(Π♥(y)))
u ⊆ (χ(Π♥(x)))
u ∩ (χ(Π♥(y)))
u.
⋆ The expression on the right of the inclusion is obviously a union of granules in the
PRAX.
⋆ From a constructive bottom-up perspective, let p1, p2, . . . ps be a collection of
subsets of x \ xl such that
∪pi ⊆ x \ x
l
(∃z) pui = [z]
∪i 6=j(pi ∩ pj) is minimal on all such collections.
⋆ Now we add subsets k(pi) of x
uu \ xc to x to form the required maximal subset.
⋆ For the lower approximation part, we simple use the preservation of l by cap.
Prop 6.6. For each x ∈ ℘(S) let xg = (x♥)u, then we have the following properties:
(∀x)x ⊆ xg.
(∀x)xgg = xg.
Proof. x♥u♥u = x♥u. Because if we could add a part of a class that retains the equality
of lower approximations, then that should be adjoinable in the construction of x♥ as
well.
The following limited representation theorem can be useful for connections with covers.
Definition 6.5. Let X be a set and C : ℘(X) 7−→ ℘(X) a map satisfying all the
following conditions:
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))A ⊆ C(A) (Inclusion)
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))C(C(A)) = C(A) (Idempotence)
(∀A,B ∈ ℘(S)) (A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A) −→ C(A) ⊆ C(B)) (Cautious Monotony,)
then C will said to be a cautious closure operator (CCO) on X.
Definition 6.6. Let H = 〈H, 〉, be a partially ordered set over a set H. A subset K
of the set of order ideals F(H) of H will be said to be relevant for a subset B ⊆ H (in
symbols ρ(K, H)) if and only if the following hold:
(∃G ∈ K)(∀P ∈ K)P ⊆ G.
(∀P ∈ K)P ⊆ B.
For any L ⊆ F(H), if K ⊆ L, then
(∃⊤ ∈ L)(∀Y ∈ L)Y ⊆ ⊤ 6= H & ∩L = ∩K.
Definition 6.7. In the context of Def.6.6, a map  : ℘(L) 7−→ ℘(L) defined as below
will be said to be safe
(Z) =
{
∩K, if all relevant collections for Z have same intersection.
∩{α : Z ⊆ α ∈ F(H)}, else.
Prop 6.7. A safe map  is a cautious closure operator.
Proof. The verification of idempotence and inclusion is direct.
⋆ For A,B ∈ ℘(L), if we have A ⊆ B ⊆ (A),
⋆ then either A ⊆ B ⊆ (B) ⊆ (A) or A ⊆ B ⊆ (A) ⊆ (B) must be true.
⋆ If the former inclusions hold, then it is necessary that (A) = (B).
⋆ If (B) is defined as the the intersection of order ideals and (A) as that of relevant
subcollections, then it is necessary that (A) ⊆ (B). So cautious monotony holds.
It can also be checked that monotonicity fails in this kind of situation.
Theorem 6.3. On every Boolean ordered unary algebra of the form
H = 〈℘(H),⊆, C〉 ,
there exists a partial order ≤ on K such that 〈℘(K),⊆, 〉 is isomorphic to H.

7 Atoms in the POSET of Rough Objects
Definition 7.1. For any two elements x, y ∈ ℘(S)| ≈, let
x ≤ y if and only if (∀a ∈ x)(∀b ∈ y)al ⊆ bl & au ⊆ bu.
℘(S)| ≈ will be denoted by H in what follows.
Prop 7.1. The relation ≤ defined on H is a bounded and directed partial order. The
least element will be denoted by 0 (0 = {∅}) and the greatest by 1 (1 = {S}).
Definition 7.2. For any a, b ∈ H, let UB(a, b) = {x : a ≤ x & b ≤ x} and LB(a, b) =
{x : x ≤ a & x ≤ b}. By a s-ideal (strong ideal) of H, we will mean a subset K that
satisfies all of
(∀x ∈ H)(∀a ∈ K)(x ≤ a −→ x ∈ K),
(∀a, b ∈ K)UB(a, b) ∩K 6= ∅.
An atom of H is any element that covers 0. The set of atoms of H will be denoted by
At(H).
Theorem 7.1. Atoms of H will be of one of the following types:
Type-0 Elements of the form (∅, [x]), that intersect no other set of roughly equivalent
sets.
Type-1 Bruinvals of the form (∅, α), that do not contain full sets of roughly equivalent
sets.
Type-2 Bruinvals of the form (α, β), that do not contain full sets of roughly equivalent
sets and are such that (∀x)xl = ∅.
Proof. It is obvious that a bruinval of the form (α, β) can be an atom only if α is the
∅. If not, then each element x of the bruinval (∅, α) will satisfy xl = ∅ ⊂ xu, thereby
contradicting the assumption that (α, β) is an atom.
If [x] intersects no other successor neighborhood, then
(∀y ∈ (∅, [x]))yl = ∅ & xu = [x]
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and it will be a minimal set of roughly equal elements containing 0.
The other part can be verified based on the representation of possible sets of roughly
equivalent elements.
Theorem 7.2. The partially ordered set H is atomic.
Proof. We need to prove that any element x greater than 0 is either an atom or there
exists an atom a such that a ≤ x, that is
(∀x)(∃a ∈ At(H))(0 < x −→ a ≤ x).
Suppose the bruinval (α, β) represents a non-atom, then it is necessary that
(∀x ∈ α)xl 6= ∅ & xu ⊆ S.
Suppose the neighborhoods included in xu are {[y] : y ∈ B ⊆ S}. If all combinations of
bruinvals of the form (∅, γ) formed from these neighborhoods are not atoms, then it is
necessary that the upper approximation of every singleton subset of a set in γ properly
contains another non-trivial upper approximation. This is impossible.
So H is atomic.
8 Algebraic Semantics-1
An algebraic semantics is a complete description of reasoning about rough objects in-
volved in the context of PRAX or PRAS or any particular instances thereof. In the present
author’s view the objects of interest should be roughly equal elements in some sense and
the semantics should avoid objects of other kinds (from other semantic domains) thereby
contaminating the semantics. But in any perspective, semantics relative any semantic
domain is of interest. When it comes to the question of defining sensible operations over
rough objects, given the ontological constraints, there is scope for much variation.
If A, B ∈ ℘(S) and A ≈ B then Au ≈ Bu and Al ≈ Bl, but ¬(A ≈ Au) in general. We
have already seen that ≤ is a partial order relation on ℘(S)| ≈. In this chapter we will
be working mostly on ℘(S)| ≈ and will use lower case Greek alphabets for elements in it.
Theorem 8.1. The following operations can be defined on ℘(S)| ≈ (A, B ∈ ℘(S) and
[A], [B] are corresponding classes):
L[A]
∆
= [Al] (8.1)
[A]⊙ [B]
∆
= [
⋃
X∈[A], Y ∈[B]
(X ∩ Y )] (8.2)
[A]⊕ [B]
∆
= [
⋃
X∈[A], Y ∈[B]
(X ∪ Y )] (8.3)
U [A]
∆
= [Au] (8.4)
[A] · [B]
∆
= λ(LB([A], [B])) (8.5)
[A]⊛ [B]
∆
= λ(UB([A], [B])) (8.6)
[A] + [B]
∆
= {X : X l = (Al ∩Bl)l & Xu = Au ∪Bu} (8.7)
[A]× [B]
∆
= {X : X l = Al ∪Bl & Xu = Al ∪Bl ∪ (Au ∩Bu) (8.8)
[A]⊗ [B]
∆
= {X : X l = Al ∪Bl & Xu = Au ∪Bu}. (8.9)
Proof. If A ≈ B then Au ≈ Bu and Al ≈ Bl, but ¬(A ≈ Au) in general.
1. If B ∈ [A], then Bl = Al, Bu = Au and L[A] = L[B] = [Al].
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2. [A]⊙ [B]
∆
= [
⋃
X∈[A], Y ∈[B](X ∩Y )] is obviously well defined as sets of the form [A]
are elements of partitions
3. Similar to the above.
4. If B ∈ [A], then Bu = Au and so [Bu] = [Au].
5. [A] · [B]
∆
= λ(LB([A], [B])).
6. [A]⊛ [B]
∆
= λ(UB([A], [B])).
7. [A] + [B]
∆
= {X : X l = Al ∩Bl & Xu = Au ∪Bu}. As the definitions is in terms
of Al, Bl, Au, Bu, so there is no issue.
8. Similar to above.
9. Similar to above.
+, × and ⊗ will be referred to as pragmatic aggregation, commonality and commonality
operations as they are less ontologically committed to the classical domain and more
dependent on the main rough domain of interest. + and the other pragmatic operations
cannot be compared by the ≤ relation and so do not confirm to intuitive understanding
of the concepts of aggregation and commonality.
The following theorems summarize the essential properties of the defined operations:
Theorem 8.2.
LL(α) = L(α). (L1)
(α ≤ β −→ L(α) ≤ L(β)). (L2)
(L(α) = [α] −→ α = {αl}). (L3)
(U(α) ∩ UU(α) 6= ∅ −→ U(α) = UU(α)). (U1)
(UU(α) = ∅ 9 U(α) = ∅). (U2)
(α ≤ β −→ U(α) ≤ U(β). (U3)
(U(α) = α −→ α = αl = αu). (U4)
UL(α) ≤ U(α). (U5)
LU(α) = U(α). (U6)
Proof. Let α ∈ ℘(S)| ≈, then we can associate a pair of lower and upper approximations
denoted by αl and αu respectively. By α
u and αl we mean the global operations respec-
tively on the set α (seen as an element of ℘(S)). These take singleton values and so we
do not really need the approximations αl and αu and shall use the former.
Proof of L1:
α ∈ ℘(S)| ≈, so α = {X ; αl = X
l & αu = X
u,&X ∈ ℘(S)}.
αl = {X l; X ∈ α} = {αl}
So [αl] = {Y ; Y l = αl & Y u = αlu}.
(L(α))l = {Y l ; Y l = αl & Y u = αlu} = {αl}.
This yields LL(α) = L(α). (L1)
Proof of U1:
αu = {Xu ; αl = X l & αu = Xu} = {αu}.
U(α) = [αu] = {Y ; Y l = αu & Y u = αuu}.
So U(α)u = {αuu}.
UU(α) = [U(α)u] = [αuu] = {Y ; Y l = αuu & Y u = αuuu}.
Since α ⊆ αu ⊆ αuu ⊆ αuuu,
therefore (U(α) ∩ UU(α) 6= ∅ −→ U(α) = UU(α). (U1)
The other parts can be proved from the above considerations.
Theorem 8.3. In the context of the above theorem, the following hold:
α⊙ β = β ⊙ α) (CO1)
α ≤ α⊙ α (CO2)
α ≤ α⊙⊤ (CO3)
α⊙ α = α⊙ (α⊙ α) = α⊙⊤ (CO4)
α⊕ β = β ⊕ α) (AO1)
α ≤ α⊕ β (AO2)
α ≤ α⊕⊥ (AO3)
(α⊕ α)⊕ α = α⊕ α (AO4)
In general, α⊕ (α⊙ β) 6= α. (AC)
Proof. CO1 The definition of ⊙ does not depend on the order in which we take the
arguments as set theoretic intersection and union are commutative. To be precise⋃
X∈[A], Y ∈[B](X ∩ Y ) =
⋃
X∈[A], Y ∈[B](Y ∩X).
CO2
⋃
X∈[A], Y ∈[A](X ∩Y ) =
⋃
X∈[A]X. But because X
l ∪Y l ⊆ (X ∪Y )l in general, so
we do not have equality.
CO3 Follows from the last inequality.
CO4 In [α ⊙ (α ⊙ α)], we cannot introduce any new elements that are not in [α ⊙ α]
as the inequality in [CO2] is due to the lower approximation and we have already
included all possible subsets
AO1 The definition of ⊕ does not depend on the order in which we take the arguments
as set theoretic union is commutative.
AO2 Even when β = α, we can have the inequality for reasons mentioned earlier.
Proof of [AO3, AO4, AC] are analogous or direct.
The above result means that ⊙ is an imperfect commonality relation. It is a proper
commonality among a certain subset of elements of H.
Theorem 8.4. In the context of the above theorem, the following properties of +, ×,⊗
are provable:
α+ α = α, (+I)
α+ β = β + α, (+C)
α× α = α, (cI)
α× β = β × α, (cC)
α ≤ β −→ α+ γ ≤ β + γ, (+Is)
α ≤ β −→ α× γ ≤ β × γ, (cIs)
α ≤ β −→ α ≤ α× β ≤ β, (+In)
α+ β ≤ α⊕ β, (R1)
α× β ≤ (α× β)⊕ α. (Mix1)
Proof. Most of the proof is in Sec.9, so we do not repeat them here.
Definition 8.1. By a Concrete Pre-PRAX Algebraic System (CPPRAXA), we will mean
a system of the form
H = 〈H, ≤, L, U,⊕,⊙,+,×,⊗,⊥,⊤〉 ,
with all of the operations being as defined in this chapter.
Apparently we need to involve the algebraic properties of the rough objects of lo, uo to
arrive at a representation theorem. Further we can improve the operations defined to
some extent by the related operations of the following chapter. Results concerning this
will appear separately. Definable filters in general have reasonable properties.
Definition 8.2. Let K be an arbitrary subset of a CPPRAXA H. Consider the following
statements:
(∀x ∈ K)(∀y ∈ H)(x ≤ y ⇒ y ∈ K). (F1)
(∀x, y ∈ K)x⊕ y, Lx ∈ K. (F2)
(∀a, b ∈ H)(1 6= a⊕ b ∈ K ⇒ a ∈ K or b ∈ K). (F3)
(∀a, b ∈ H)(1 6= UB(a, b) ∈ K ⇒ a ∈ K or b ∈ K). (F4)
(∀a, b ∈ K)LB(a, b) ∩K 6= ∅. (F5)
⋆ If K satisfies F1 then it will be said to be an order filter. The set of such filters on
H will be denoted by OF (H).
⋆ If K satisfies F1, F2 then it will be said to be a filter. The set of such filters on
H will be denoted by F(H).
⋆ If K satisfies F1, F2, F3 then it will be said to be a prime filter. The set of such
filters on H will be denoted by FP (H).
⋆ If K satisfies F1, F4 then it will be said to be a prime order filter. The set of such
filters on H will be denoted by OPF (H).
⋆ If K satisfies F1, F5 then it will be said to be an strong order filter. The set of
such filters on H will be denoted by OSF (H).
Dual concepts of ideals of different kinds can be defined.
Prop 8.1. Filters of different kinds have the following properties:
⋆ Every set of filters of a kind is ordered by inclusion.
⋆ Every filter of a kind is contained in a maximal filter of the same kind.
⋆ OSF (H) is an algebraic lattice, with its compact elements being the finitely generated
strong order filters in it.
Definition 8.3. For F,P ∈ F(H), we can define the following operations:
F ∧ P
∆
= F ∩ P
F ∨ P
∆
= 〈F ∪ P 〉 ,
where 〈F ∪ P 〉 denotes the smallest filter containing F ∪ P .
Theorem 8.5. 〈F(H), ∨, ∧,⊥,⊤〉 is an atomistic bounded lattice.
9 Algebraic Semantics-2
We have seen that ordered pairs of the form (Al, Au) do correspond to rough objects by
definition. If we choose to ignore the representation and finer aspects of possible reason-
able aggregation and commonality operations, then we still obtain an interesting order
structure based fragment of semantic processes that is very useful in the approximation
based semantics that we consider in subsequent chapters.
Definition 9.1. In a PRAX S, let
R(S) = {(Al, Au) ; A ∈ ℘(S)}.
Then we can define all of the following operations on R(S):
(Al, Au) ∨ (Bl, Bu)
∆
= (Al ∪Bl, Au ∪Bu). (Aggregation)
If (Al ∩Bl, (Au ∩Bu)) ∈ R(S) then
(Al, Au) ∧ (Bl, Bu)
∆
= (Al ∩Bl, (Au ∩Bu)). (Commonality)
If (Auc, Alc) ∈ R(S) then
∼ (Al, Au)
∆
= (Auc, Alc). (Weak Complementation)
⊥
∆
= (∅, ∅). ⊤
∆
= (S, S). (Bottom, Top)
(Al, Au) ⊼ (Bl, Bu)
∆
= ((Al ∩Bl)l, (Au ∩Bu)l). (Proper Commonality)
Definition 9.2. In the context of the above definition, a partial algebra of the form
R(S) = 〈R(S), ∨, ∧, c, ⊥, ⊤〉 will be termed a proto-vague algebra and Rf (S) =
〈R(S), ∨, ∧, ⊼. c, ⊥, ⊤〉 will be termed a full proto-vague algebra.
More generally, if L, U are arbitrary rough lower and upper approximation operators
over the PRAX, and if we replace each occurrence of l by L and u by U in the above
definition then we will term the resulting algebra of the above form a LU -proto-vague
partial algebra. Thus we will speak of louo-proto-vague algebras and such.
Theorem 9.1. A full proto-vague partial algebra Rf (S) satisfies all of the following:
1. ∨,⊼ are total operations.
2. ∨ is a semi-lattice operation satisfying idempotency, commutativity and associativ-
ity.
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3. ∧ is a weak semi-lattice operation satisfying idempotency, weak strong commutativ-
ity and weak associativity. With ∨ it forms a weak distributive lattice.
4. ∼ is a weak strong idempotent partial operation; ∼∼∼ α
ω∗
=∼ α.
5. ∼ (α ∨ β)
ω
=∼ α∧ ∼ β (Weak De Morgan condition) holds.
6. ⊼ is an idempotent, commutative and associative operation that forms a lattice with
∨.
7. α ⊼⊥ = α ∧ ⊥ = ⊥. α ∨ ⊥ = α; α ⊼⊤ = α ∧ ⊤ = α. α ∨⊤ = ⊤.
8. ∼ (α ∧ β) = (∼ α∨ ∼ β) −→∼ (α ⊼ β) = (∼ α∨ ∼ β).
9. α ∨ (β ⊼ γ) ⊆ (α ∨ β) ⊼ (α ∨ γ), but distributivity fails.
Proof. Let α = (X l,Xu), β = (Y l, Y u) and γ = (Z l, Zu) for some X, Y, Z ∈ ℘(S),
then
1. α ∨ β = (X l ∪ Y l,Xu ∪ Y u) belongs to R(S) because the components are unions
of successor neighborhoods and X l ∪ Y l ⊆ Xu ∪ Y u. The proof for ∧ is similar.
2. α∨ (β ∨ γ) = (X l,Xu)∨ ((Y l, Y u)∨ (Z l, Zu)) = (X l,Xu)∨ (Y l ∪Z l, Y u ∪Zu) =
(X l ∪ Y l ∪ Z l,Xu ∪ Y u ∪ Zu) = (α ∨ β) ∨ γ.
3. We prove weak absorptivity and weak distributivity alone.
(X l ∩ (X l ∪ Y l)) = X l and (Xu ∩ (Xu ∪ Y u)) = X l hold in all situations. If
(X l∪ (X l∩Y l)) is defined then it is equal to X l and if (Xu∪ (Xu∪Y u)) is defined,
then it is equal to Xu. So
α ∨ (α ∧ β)
ω
= α=α ∧ (α ∨ β).
For distributivity (α ∨ (β ∧ γ)
ω
= (α ∨ β) ∧ (α ∨ γ) and α ∧ (β ∨ γ)
ω
= (α ∧ β) ∨
(α∧ γ)) again it is a matter of definability working in coherence with set-theoretic
distributivity.
4. If ∼ α is defined then ∼ α = (Xuc,X lc) and
∼∼ α =∼ (Xuc,X lc) = (X lcc,Xucc) = (X l,Xu),
by definition. If ∼∼ α is defined, then ∼ α is necessarily defined. So
∼∼∼ α
ω∗
= ∼ α.
5. If ∼ (α ∨ β) and ∼ α∧ ∼ β are defined then ∼ (α ∨ β) =∼ ((X l ∪ Y l), (Xu ∪
Y u)) = ((Xuc ∩ Y uc), (X lc ∩ Y lc))
ω∗
= (Xuc,X lc) ∧ (Y uc, Y lc) =∼ α∧ ∼ β. So
∼ (α ∨ β)
ω∗
= ∼ α∧ ∼ β.
6. α ⊼ β = β ⊼ α & α ⊼ α = α are obvious.
α⊼(β⊼γ) = ((X l∩(Y l∩Z l)l)l, (Xu∩(Y u∩Zu)u)u) The components are basically
the unions of common granules among the three. No granule in the final evaluation
is eliminated by choice of order of operations. So α ⊼ (β ⊼ γ) = (α ⊼ β) ⊼ γ.
α ⊼ (α ∨ β) = ((X l ∩ (X l ∪ Y l))l, (Xu ∩ (Xu ∪ Y u))l) = α.
Further, α ∨ (α ⊼ β) = ((X l ∪ (X l ∩ Y l)l), (Xu ∪ (Xu ∩ Y u)l)) = α. So ∨,⊼ are
lattice operations.
7. ⋆ Since ⊥ = (∅, ∅), α ⊼⊥ = α ∧ ⊥ = ⊥ and α ∨ ⊥ = α follow directly.
⋆ Since ⊤ = (S, S), α ⊼⊤ = α ∧ ⊤ = α and α ∨ ⊤ = ⊤ follow directly.
8. Follows from the previous proofs.
9. ⋆ α ∨ (β ⊼ γ) = ((X l ∪ (Y l ∩ Z l)l), (Xu ∪ (Y u ∩ Zu)l)). If a ∈ S and [a] ⊆
X l∪(Y l∩Z l)l, and [a] ⊆ (Y l∩Z l)l, then [a] ⊆ Y l and [a] ⊆ Z l. So [a] ⊆ X l∪Y l
and [a] ⊆ X l ∪ Z l.
⋆ If [a] ⊆ X l ∪ (Y l ∩Z l)l and if [a] = P ∪Q, with P ⊆ X l, Q ⊆ (Y l ∩Z l)l then
[a] ⊆ X l ∪ Y l and [a] ⊆ X l ∪ Z l. This proves α ∨ (β ⊼ γ) ⊆ (α ∨ β) ⊼ (α ∨ γ).
⋆ If [a] ⊆ ((X l ∪ Y l) ∩ (X l ∪ Y l))l then [a] ⊆ X l ∪ Y l and [a] ⊆ X l ∪ Z l. This
means [a] = P ∪ Q, with P ⊆ X l, Q ⊆ Y l and Q ⊆ Z l and Q is contained
in union of some other granules. So Q ⊆ Y l ∩ Z l, but we cannot ensure
Q ⊆ (Y l ∩ Z l)l (required counterexamples are easy to construct). It follows
that ((X l ∪ Y l) ∩ (X l ∪ Y l))l * X l ∪ (Y l ∩ Z l)l.
The following theorem provides us a condition for ensuring that ∼ α is defined.
Theorem 9.2. If Xuu = Xu, then ∼ (X l,Xu) = (Xuc,X lc) but the converse is not
necessarily true.
Proof. ⋆ ∼ (X l,Xu) is defined if and only if Xuc is a union of granules.
⋆ If Xuu = Xu then Xuc is a union of granules generated by some of the elements
in Xuc , but the converse need not hold.
⋆ So we have the result.
Let W be any quasi-order relation that approximates R, and let the granules [x]w, [x]wi
and lw, uw be lower and upper approximations defined by analogy with the definitions
of l, u. If R ⊂ W , then (∀x ∈ S) [x] ⊆ [x]w and we have the following scenario (A, B ∈
℘(S). We write A ‖ B for A * B & B * A):
⋆ If A ⊂ B and Au = Bu, then it is possible that Auw ⊂ Buw .
⋆ If A ⊂ B and Al = Bl, then it is possible that Alw ⊂ Blw .
⋆ If A ⊂ B and Auw = Buw , then it is possible that Au ⊂ Bu.
⋆ If A ⊂ B and Alw = Blw , then it is possible that Al ⊂ Bl.
⋆ If A ‖ B and Al = Bl, then it is possible that Alw ‖ Blw .
⋆ If A ‖ B and Alw = Blw , then it is possible that Al ‖ Bl.
⋆ If A ‖ B and Au = Bu, then it is possible that Auw ‖ Buw .
⋆ If A ‖ B and Auw = Buw , then it is possible that Au ‖ Bu.
⋆ If A ⊂ B, Al = Bl and Au = Bu , then it is possible that Auw ⊂ Buw & Alw ⊂ Blw .
The above properties mean that meaningful correspondences between vague partial alge-
bras and Nelson algebras may be quite complex. Focusing on granular evolution alone,
we can define
(∀x ∈ S)ϕo([x]) =
⋃
z∈[x]
[z]w.
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))ϕ(Al) =
⋃
[x]⊆Al
ϕo([x]).
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))ϕ(Au) =
⋃
[x]⊆Au
ϕo([x]).
ϕ(Al ∪Bl) =
⋃
[x]⊆Al∪Bl .
If [x] ⊆ Al ∪Bl
ϕ can be naturally extended by components to a map τ as per
τ(Al, Au) = (ϕ(Al), ϕ(Au)).
Prop 9.1. If R ⊆ Rw and Rw is transitive, then
⋆ If z ∈ [x] and x ∈ [z], then ϕ([z]) = ϕ([x]).
⋆ If z ∈ [x], then ϕ([z]) ⊆ ϕ([x]).
⋆
(∀A ∈ ℘(S))ϕ(Al) =
⋃
[x]⊆Al
ϕ([x]) =
⋃
[x]⊆Al
[x]w
Proof. ⋆ z ∈ [x] yields Rzx. So if Raz, then Rax and it is clear that ϕ([z]) ⊆ ϕ([x]).
Rbx&Rzx&Rxz implies Rwbz .
⋆ This is the first part of the above.
⋆ Follows from the above.
Definition 9.3. We will use the following abbreviations for handling different types of
subsets of S:
Γu(S) = {A
u;A ∈ ℘(S)}. (Uppers)
Γuw(S) = {A
uw ;A ∈ ℘(S)}. (w-Uppers)
Γ(S) = {B; (∃A ∈ ℘(S))B = Al or B = Au}. (lower definites)
Note that δl(S) is the same as Γ(S) and similarly for δlw(S).
τ has the following properties:
Prop 9.2. If R ⊆ Rw and Rw is transitive, then
τ(⊥) = ⊥w.
τ(⊤) = ⊤w.
(∀α, β ∈ R(S)) τ(α ∨ β)= τ(α) ∨ τ(β).
(∀α, β ∈ R(S)) τ(α ∧ β)
ω
= τ(α) ∧ τ(β).
Proof.
Definition 9.4. For each α ∈ Rw(S), the set of ordered pairs τ
⊣(α) will be termed as a
co-rough object of S, where
τ⊣(α) = {β ; β ∈ R(S) & τ(β) = α}.
The collection of all co-rough objects will be denoted by CR(S).
This permits us to define a variety of closely related semantics of PRAX when R ⊆ Rw
and Rw is transitive. These include:
• The map τ : Rf (S) 7−→ Rw(S). Rw(S) being a Nelson algebra over an algebraic
lattice.
• Rf (S) ∪ CR(S) along with induced operations yields another semantics of PRAX.
• R(S) ∪ Rw(S) enriched with algebraic and dependency operations described in 12.
10 Approximate Relations
If R is a binary relation on a set X, then we let Ro
∂
= R ∪ ∆X . The weak transitive
closure of R will be denoted by R#. If R(i) is the i-times composition
R ◦R . . . ◦R︸ ︷︷ ︸
i-times , then
R# =
⋃
R(i). R is acyclic if and only if (∀x)¬R#xx. The relation R· is defined by R·ab
if and only if Rab & ¬(R#ab & R#ba).
Definition 10.1. If R is a relation on a set S, then the relations R⋋, Rcyc and Rh will
be defined via
R⋋ab if and only if [b]Ro ⊂ [a]Ro & [a]iRo ⊂ [b]iRo (10.1)
Rcycab if and only if R#ab & R#ba (10.2)
Rhab if and only if R⋋ab & R·ab. (10.3)
In case of PRAX, Ro = R, so the definition of R⋋ would involve neighborhoods of the
form [a] and [a]i alone. R
⋋ ⊂ R and R⋋ is a partial order.
Persistent Example 10.1. In our example 1.1, R#ab happens when a is an ally of an
ally of b. R⋋ab happens iff every ally of b is an ally of a and if a is ally of c, then b is an
ally of c - this can happen, for example, when b is a Marxist feminist and a is a socialist
feminist. Rcycab happens when a is an ally of an ally of b and b is an ally of an ally of a.
R·ab happens whenever a is an ally of b, but b is not an ally of anybody who is an ally of
a.
Theorem 10.1. Rh = ∅.
Proof.
Rhab⇔ R⋋ab & R·ab
⇔ τ(R)ab & (R \ τ(R))ab
But ¬(∃a)(R \ τ(R))aa.
So Rh = ∅.
Prop 10.1. All of the following hold in a PRAX S:
R·ab ↔ (R \ τ(R))ab (10.4)
(∀a, b)¬(R·ab & R·ba) (10.5)
(∀a, b, c)(R·ab & R·bc −→ ¬R·ac). (10.6)
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Proof. ⋆ R·ab ↔ Rab & ¬(R#abR#ba).
⋆ But ¬(R#abR#ba) is possible only when both Rab and Rba hold.
⋆ So R·ab ↔ Rab & ¬(τ(R)ab) ↔ (R \ τ(R))ab.
Theorem 10.2.
R#· = R# \ τ(R) (10.7)
R·# = (R \ τ(R))# (10.8)
(R \ τ(R))# ⊆ R# \ τ(R). (10.9)
Proof. 1.
R#·ab↔R#ab & ¬(R##ab & R##ba)
↔R#ab & ¬(R#ab & R#ba)
↔R#ab & ¬τ(R)ab
↔(R# \ τ(R))ab.
2.
R·#ab↔(R·)#ab
↔(R \ τ(R))#ab.
3. Can be checked by a contradiction or a direct argument.
We now look at possible properties that approximations of prototransitive relations
may/should possess. If < is a strict partial order on S and R is a relation, then consider
the conditions :
(∀a, b)(a < b −→ R#ab). (PO1)
(∀a, b)(a < b −→ ¬R#ba). (PO2)
(∀a, b)(R⋋ab & R·ab −→ a < b. (PO3)
If a ≡R b, then a ≡< b. (PO4)
(∀a, b)(a < b −→ Rab). (PO5)
As per [6], < is said to be a partial order approximation POA (resp. weak partial order
approximation WPOA) of R if and only if PO1, PO2, PO3, PO4 (resp. PO1, PO3,
PO4) hold. A POA < is inner approximation IPOA of R if and only if PO5 holds. PO4
has a role beyond that of approximation and depends on both successor and predecessor
neighborhoods. Rh, R·⋋ are IPOA, while R·#, R#· are POAs.
By a lean quasi order approximation < of R, we will mean a quasi order satisfying
PO1 and PO2. The corresponding sets of such approximations of R will be denoted by
POA(R), WPOA(R), IPOA(R), IWPOA(R) and LQO(R)
Theorem 10.3. For any A, B ∈ LQO(R), we can define the operations &,∨,⊤:
(∀x, y)(A&B)xy if and only if (∀x, y)Axy & Bxy.
(A ∨B) = (A ∪B)#,
⊤ = R#.
Proof. ⋆ If Aab then R+ab and if Bab then R+ab.
⋆ But if (A&B)ab, then both Aab and Bab.
⋆ So R+ab.
Similarly it can be shown that A ∨ B ∈ LQO(R). It is always defined and contained
within R# as it is the transitive completion of A∪B. ⊤ = R# as transitive closure is a
closure operator.
Theorem 10.4. In a PRAX, R·# &R#·xy ↔ (R \ τ(R))#xy.
10.1 Granules of Derived Relations
The behavior of approximations and rough objects corresponding to derived relations is
investigated in this section.
Definition 10.2. The relation R#· will be termed the trans ortho-completion of R. The
following granules will be associated with each x ∈ S :
[x]ot = {y ; R
#·yx } (10.10)
[x]iot = {y ; R
#·xy } (10.11)
[x]oot = {y ; R
#·yx & R#·xy}. (10.12)
Let the corresponding approximations be lot, uot and so on.
Theorem 10.5. In a PRAX S, (∀x ∈ S) [x]oot = {x}.
Proof. R#·xy & R#·yx means that the pair (x, y) is in the transitive completion of R
and not in τ(R). So y ∈ [x]oot if and only if
(∃a, b)Rxa & Ray & (¬Rax ∨ ¬Rya) & (Ryb & Rbx) & (¬Rby ∨ ¬Rxb).
If we assume that x 6= y, then each of the possibilities leads to a contradiction as is
shown below. In the context of the above statement:
Case-1
⋆ Rxa & Ray & ¬Rax & Rya & Ryb & Rbx & ¬Rby & Rxb.
⋆ This yields R#xa & R#bb & R#ba & R#ab.
⋆ So, R#xb & R#ya & R#ax and we have contradicted our original assumption.
Case-2
⋆ Rxa & Ray & Rax & ¬Rya & Ryb & Rbx & Rby & ¬Rxb.
⋆ This yields the contradiction R#ab.
Case-3
⋆ Rxa & Ray & ¬Rax & Rya & Ryb & Rbx & Rby & ¬Rxb.
⋆ This yields R#ba&R#ab&R#aa&R#bb and R#yy&R#xy&R#yx&Rya&R#xa.
⋆ But such a R# is not possible.
Somewhat similarly the other cases can be seen to lead to contradictions.
By the symmetric center of a relation R, we will mean the set KR =
⋃
ei(τ(R) \∆S) -
basically the union of elements in either component of τ(R) minus the diagonal relation
on S.
Prop 10.2. (∀x) [x]△[x]ot 6= ∅ as
x /∈ KR −→ [x] ⊂ [x]ot
x ∈ KR −→ [x] * [x]ot & {x} ⊂ [x] ∩ [x]ot.
Proof.
z ∈ [x]ot ↔ R
#·zx
↔ R#zx & ¬τ(R)zx
↔ (Rzx & ¬Rxz) or (¬Rzx & ¬Rxz & (R# \R)zx).
KR can be used to partially categorize subsets of S based on intersection.
Prop 10.3. (R \ τ(R))# ∪ τ(R) is not necessarily a quasi order.
Proof. (x, y) ∈ (R \ τ(R))# ∪ τ(R) and (x, y) /∈ τ(R) and x ∈ KR & y /∈ KR and
∃z ∈ KR & z 6= x & Rzx do not disallow Rzy. So (R \ τ(R))
# ∪ τ(R) is not necessarily
a quasi-order. We leave the missing part to the reader.
Prop 10.4. ((R \ τ(R))# ∪ τ(R))# = R#.
Proof. Clearly R ⊆ ((R \ τ(R))# ∪ τ(R))# and it can be directly checked that if a ∈
((R \ τ(R))# ∪ τ(R))# \R then a ∈ R# \R and conversely.

11 Transitive Completion and Approximate
Semantics
The interaction of the rough approximations in a PRAX and the rough approximations
in the transitive completion can be expected to follow some order. The definite or rough
objects most closely related to the difference of lower approximations and those related
to the difference of upper approximations can be expected to be related in a nice way.
We show that this nice way is not really a rough way. But the results proved remain
relevant for the formulation of semantics that involves that of the transitive completion
as in [7, 8]. A rough theoretical alternative is possible by simply starting from sets
of the form A∗ = (Al \ Al#) ∪ (Au# \ Au) and taking their lower (l#) and upper (u#)
approximations - the resulting structure would be a partial algebra derived from a Nelson
algebra over an algebraic lattice ( [2]).
Prop 11.1. For an arbitrary proto-transitive reflexive relation R on a set S, (we use #
subscripts for neighborhoods, approximation operators and rough equalities of the weak
transitive completion) all of the following hold:
(∀x ∈ S) [x]R ⊆ [x]R# (Nbd)
(∀A ⊆ S)Al ⊆ Al# & Au ⊆ Au# (App)
(∀A ⊆ S)(∀B ∈ [A]≈)(∀C ∈ [A]≈#)B
l ⊆ C l# & Bu ⊆ Cu# (REq)
The reverse inclusions are false in general in the second assertion in a specific way. Note
that the last condition induces a more general partial order  over ℘(℘(S)) via A  B if
and only if (∀C ∈ A)(∀E ∈ B)C l ⊆ El# & Cu ⊆ Eu# .
Proof. The first of these is direct. For simplicity, we will denote the successor neighbor-
hoods of x by [x] and [x]# respectively. We look at the possibility tracking in the first
part of the second assertion.
⋆ If z ∈ Al# then z ∈ Al as [x]# ⊆ A implies [x] ⊆ A.
⋆ If z ∈ Al then (∃x) z ∈ [x] ⊆ Al.
⋆ For this x, z ∈ [x]#, but it is possible that [x]# ⊆ A or [x]# * A.
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⋆ If [x]# * A, and (∃b /∈ A)R#ax & Rab & Rbx then we have a contradiction as
Rbx means b ∈ [x].
⋆ If [x]# * A, and (∃b ∈ A)R#ax & Rab & Rbx all we need is a c /∈ A &Rcb that
is compatible with R#cx and A
l * Al# .
Definition 11.1. By the l-scedastic approximation lˆ and the u-scedastic approximation
uˆ of a subset A ⊆ S we will mean the following approximations:
Alˆ = (Al \Al#)l, Auˆ = (Au# \ Au)u# .
The above cross difference approximation is the best possible from closeness to properties
of rough approximations.
Theorem 11.1. For an arbitrary subset A ⊆ S of a PRAX S,the following statements
and diagram of inclusion (→) hold:
⋆ Al#l = Al# = All# = Al#l#
⋆ If Au ⊂ Au# then Auu# ⊆ Au#u#.
Al# Al
Al#u Alu
Al#u#
A Au Au#
Figure 11.1: Relation Between Approximate Approximations
Proof. It is clear that Al ⊆ Au ⊆ Au# . So Al * Au# \Au.
x ∈ (Al \Al#)l ⇒ (∃y) [y]# * A & x ∈ [y] ⊂ A & x ∈ [y]#
⇒ x ∈ Au# & x ∈ Au
⇒ x /∈ Au# \ Au.
But [y]# ⊂ A
u# (∃z) z ∈ Au# & z /∈ Au & z ∈ [y]#.
So [y]# ⊂ (A
u# \Au)u# and it is possible that [y]# * (A
u# \ Au)u.
Theorem 11.2. For an arbitrary subset A ⊆ S of a PRAX S,
(Al \ Al#)l * (Au# \Au)u# −→ Au# = Au.
Au# 6= Au −→ Al \ Al#)l ⊆ (Au# \Au)u# .
Proof. • Let S = {a, b, c, e, f} and
• let R be the transitive completion satisfying Rab, Rbc, Ref .
• If B = {a, b}, B lˆ = B,
• but Bu# = {a, b, c} = Bu.
• So Buˆ = ∅.
• The second part follows from the proof of the above proposition under the restric-
tion in the premise.
Theorem 11.3. Key properties of the scedastic approximations follow:
1. (∀B ∈ ℘(S))(B lˆ = B 9 Buˆ = B).
2. (∀B ∈ ℘(S))(Buˆ = B → B lˆ = B).
3. (∀B ∈ ℘(S))B lˆlˆ = B lˆ.
4. (∀B ∈ ℘(S))Buˆuˆ 6= Buˆ.
5. It is possible that (∃B ∈ ℘(S)Buˆuˆ ⊂ Buˆ).
Proof. 1. The counter example in the proof of the above theorem works for this state-
ment.
2. x ∈ B ↔ x ∈ (Bu# \ Bu)u# ↔ (∃y ∈ Bu#)(∃z ∈ Bu# \ Bu)x, z ∈ [y]# & z ∈
Bu# & z /∈ Bu. But this situation requires that elements of the form z be related
to x and so we should have Bu# = Bu.
3. B lˆlˆ = (B lˆl \ B lˆl#)l = ((Bl \ Bl#)l \ ∅)l = B lˆ. The missing step is of proving
(Bl \Bl#)ll# = ∅.
4-5 We prove the last two assertions together. We provide a counterexample and also
show the essential pattern of deviation.
Let S = {a, b, c, e, f} and R be a reflexive relation s.t. Rab, Rbc, Ref .
If A = {a, e}, then Au# = {a, b, c, e} and Au = {a, b, e}.
Therefore Auˆ = {c} & Auˆuˆ = ∅ & Auˆuˆ ⊂ Auˆ.
In general if B is some subset, then x ∈ Buˆ = (Au# \ Au)u# ⇒ (∃y ∈
Au#)(∃z) y ∈ [z]# & y /∈ A
u & y /∈ A & z ∈ A & y /∈ [z] & y ∈ [x]#.
An interesting problem can be given A for which Au# 6= Au, when does there exist a B
such that
Bl = (Al \ Al#)l = Alˆ & Bu = (Au# \Au)u# = Auˆ?
12 Rough Dependence
In this chapter, we introduce a concept of rough dependence in general rough set theory.
By the term rough dependence, we intend to capture the relation between two objects
(crisp or rough) that have some representable rough objects in common. There is no
process for similarity with the concept mutual exclusivity of probability theory and in
rough sets we are actually handling evolution without regard to temporality. We would
like to eventually analyze the extent to which ontology of not-necessarily-rough origin
can be integrated in a seamless way. But in this monograph we will introduce basic
concepts, compare them with probabilistic concepts and look at the semantic value of
introduced functions and predicates.
Overall the following problems are basic and relevant for use in semantics:
⋆ Which concepts of rough dependence provide for an adequate semantics of rough
objects in the PRAX context?
⋆ More generally how does this relation vary over other RSTs?
⋆ Characterize the connection between granularity and rough dependence?
By relation based RST we mean rough theories originating from generalized approxima-
tion spaces of the form U = 〈U, R 〉, with U being a set and R being any binary relation
on U . If instead of a relation we start from a cover of the set, then we will refer to the
rough theory as a cover based RST.
Definition 12.1. The τν-infimal degree of dependence βiτν of A on B will be defined as
βiτν(A, B) = inf
ν(S)
⊕{C : C ∈ τ(S) & PCA & PCB}.
Here the infimum means the largest ν(S) element contained in the aggregation.
The τν-supremal degree of dependence βsτν of A on B will be defined as
βsτν(A, B) = sup
ν(S)
⊕{C : C ∈ τ(S) & PCA & PCB}.
Here the supremum means the least ν(S) element containing the sets.
The definition extends to RYS [5] in a natural way.
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Note that all of the definitions do not use real-valued rough measures and the cardinality
of sets in accord with one of the principles of avoiding contamination. The ideas of
dependence are more closely related to certain semantic operations in classical RST. But
these were never seen to be of much interest. The connections with probability theories
has been part of a number of papers including [12,13,35–37], however neither dependence
nor independence have received sufficient attention. This is the case with other papers on
entropy. It should be noted that the idea of independence in statistics is seen in relation
to probabilistic approaches, but dependence has largely not been given much importance
in applications.
The positive region of a set X is X l, while the negative region is Xuc – this region is
independent from x in the sense of attributes being distinct, but not in the sense of
derivability or inference by way of rules. When we talk of dependence or independence of
a set relative another, then a basic question would be about possible balance between the
two meta principles of independence in the rough theory and the relation to the granular
concepts of independence.
Definition 12.2. Two elements x, y in a RBRST or CBRST S will be said to be PN-
independent IPN(xy) if and only if
xl ⊆ yuc & yl ⊆ xuc.
Two elements x, y in a RBRST or CBRST S will be said to be PN-dependent ςPN (xy)
if and only if
xl * yuc & yl * xuc.
Theorem 12.1. Over the RYS corresponding to classical RST, we have the following
properties of dependence degrees when τ(S) = G(S) - the granulation of S and ν(S) =
δl(S) - the set of lower definite elements. We omit the subscripts τν and braces in
βiτν(x, y) in the following:
1. βixy = x
l ∩ yl = βsxy (subscripts i, s on β can therefore be omitted).
2. βxx = xl.
3. βxy = βyx.
4. β(βxy)x = βxy.
5. P(βxy)(βx(y ⊕ z)).
6. (Pylz −→ P(βxy)(βxz)).
7. βxy = βxlyl = βxyl.
8. β0x = 0 ; βx1 = xl.
9. (Pxy −→ βxy = xl).
We prove this in the next chapter.
Theorem 12.2. For classical RST, a semantics over the classical semantic domain can
be formulated with no reference to lower and upper approximation operators using the
operations ∩, c, β on the power-set of S, S being an approximation space.
Proof. We have already shown that l is representable in terms of β. So the the result
follows.
12.1 Dependence in PRAX
When we set ν(S) = δl(S) and τ(S) = G(S) - the successor neighborhood granulation,
then the situation in PRAX contexts is similar, but we cannot define u from l and com-
plementation. However when we set ν(S) = δu(S), then the situation is very different.
Theorem 12.3. Over the RYS corresponding to PRAX with P =⊆, ⊕ = ∪ and ⊙ = ∩,
we have the following properties of dependence degrees when τ(S) = S - the granulation
of S and ν(S) = δl(S) - the set of lower definite elements. In fact this holds in any
reflexive RBRST. We omit the subscripts τν and braces in βiτν(x, y) in the following:
1. βixy = x
l ∩ yl = βsxy (subscripts i, s on β can therefore be omitted).
2. βxx = xl; βxy = βyx.
3. (x⊙ y = 0 −→ βixy = 0), but the converse is false.
4. β(βxy)x = βxy.
5. P(βxy)(βx(y ⊕ z)).
6. (Pylz −→ P(βxy)(βxz)).
7. βxy = βxlyl = βxyl.
8. β0x = 0 ; βx1 = xl.
9. (Pxy −→ βxy = xl).
Proof. 1. βixy is the union of the collection of successor neighborhoods generated by
elements x and y that are included in both of them. So βixy = x
l ∩ yl = βsxy.
2. βxx = xl; βxy = βyx. is obvious
3. If (x ⊙ y = 0, then x and y have no elements in common and cannot have com-
mon successor neighborhoods. If βixy = 0, then x, y have no common successor
neighborhoods, but can still have common elements. So the statement follows.
4. βxy ⊆ xl ⊆ x by the first statement. So β(βxy)x = βxy.
5. P(βxy)(βx(y ⊕ z)) follows by monotonicity.
6. If Pylz is the same thing as yl ⊆ z. βxy = xl ∩ yl and βxz = xl ∩ zl by the first
statement. So we have (Pylz −→ P(βxy)(βxz)).
7. βxy = βxlyl = βxyl holds because l is an idempotent operation in a PRAX [1].
8. Rest of the statements are obvious.
Even though the properties are similar for reflexive RBRST when ν(S) = δl(S) and
τ(S) = G(S), there are key differences that can be characterized in terms of special sets.
• βxy = z if and only if (∀a ∈ z)(∃b ∈ z) a ∈ [z] ⊆ x ∩ y.
• So we can select a minimal Kz ⊆ z satisfying (∀a ∈ z)(∃b ∈ Kz) a ∈ [b] ⊆ x and
(∀e ∈ Kz) [e] ⊆ x ∩ y. Minimality being with respect to the inclusion order.
• Let Pz be the collection of all such Kz and let Bz be the subcollection of Pz
satisfying the condition: if K ∈ Bz then (∀a ∈ K)(∀b ∈ [a])(∃J ∈ Bz) b ∈ J . Pz
will be called the local basis and Bz, the local super basis of z.
Prop 12.1. For classical RST (∀z)Bz = Pz and conversely.
Theorem 12.4. In the context of 12.3, if we set ν(S) = δu(S) and τ(S) is as before,
then we have (by βxy, we mean βixy)
1. P(βxy)(βiδl(S)xy),
2. P(βxx)(xl); βxy = βyx.
3. (x⊙ y = 0 −→ βixy = 0), but the converse is false.
4. β(βxy)x = βxy.
5. P(βxy)(βx(y ⊕ z)).
6. (Pylz −→ P(βxy)(βxz)).
7. βxy = βxlyl ; P(βxyl)(βxuyu).
8. β0x = 0 ; P(βx1)(xl).
9. (Pxy −→ P(βzx)(βzy))
10. (βxy)l = βxy.
Proof. 1. By definition βiτν(A, B) = infν(S) ⊕{C : C ∈ τ(S) & PCA & PCB}, so
βxy is the greatest upper definite set contained in the union of common successor
neighborhoods included in x and y. So it is necessarily a subset of xl ∩ yl. In a
PRAX, u is not idempotent and in general xu ⊆ xuu ( [1]). So P(βxy)(βiδl(S)xy).
2. The statements P(βxx)(xl) and βxy = βyx follow from the above.
3. The proof is similar to that of third statement of 12.3.
4. In constructing β(βxy)x from βxy, we are not searching for upper definite subsets
strictly contained in the latter. So the property follows.
5. P(βxy)(βx(y ⊕ z)) follows by monotonicity.
6. Obvious from previous statements.
7. Note that βxuyu is a subset of xu ∩ yu and in general contains βxy.
8. Is a special case of the first statement. 0 is the empty set and 1 is the top.
9. Follows by monotonicity.
10. Upper definite subsets are necessarily lower definite, so (βxy)l = βxy.
The main properties of PN-dependence is as below:
Theorem 12.5. In the context of 12.3, all of the following hold (we drop the subscript
’PN’ in ςPN):
1. ςxx.
2. (ςxy ↔ ςyx).
3. In general, ςxy & ςzy does not imply ςxz. But ¬ςxz is more likely if we assume a
bit of frequentism.
4. In general, ςxy 9 ςxuyu and ςxuyu 9 ςxy.
5. (x · y = 0 −→ ¬ςxy).
6. (Pxy −→ ςxy).
Theorem 12.6. In the context of 12.3, if βxy 6= 0 then ςxy, but the converse need not
hold. In classical RST, the converse holds as well.
Proof. If βxy 6= 0, then it follows that xl ∩ yl 6= ∅ under the assumptions. If we assume
xl ⊆ yuc ∨ yl ⊆ xuc, then in each of the three cases we have a contradiction. So the first
part of the result follows.
In the classical case, if xl ⊆ yuc is not empty, then it should be a union of successor
neighborhoods and similarly for yl ⊆ xuc. These two parts should necessarily be common
to xl and yl. So the converse holds for classical RST. The proof does not work for PRAX
and we know why it does not succeed.
13 Comparison with Dependence in Probabilistic
Theories
Probability measures may not exist in the first place over any given collection of sets,
so even CBRST is necessarily more general and the idea of mutual exclusivity is not
the correct concept corresponding to rough dependence. The basic idea of probabilistic
dependence is oriented because occurrence of an event can be favorable or unfavorable
for another event. In standard versions of rough set theory this has no corresponding
concept. The concept of dependence in probability is rarely considered in the literature.
The version in [11] uses a not-so intuitive valuation but is nevertheless useful. We abstract
the subjective aspect of the valuation for comparison.
Among the different understandings of probabilistic causation, frequentism ( [38]) and
the tendency to omit necessary conditions are particularly problematic in various soft
computing situations. In avoiding real-valued rough measures, we are committing to
avoid the excesses of frequentism in rough sets.
If (X, S, p) is a probability space with X being a set, S being a σ-algebra over X and p
being a probability function (we can use a collection of probability functions and handle
more complex notions of dependence in ’probability structures’, but these add little to
the comparison), then the most natural dependence function δ : S2 7−→ ℜ is defined by
∂(x, y) = p(x ∩ y) − p(x) · p(y)
This function satisfies a number of properties that can be used to characterize depen-
dence. In the subjective probability domain where p takes value in a bounded partially
ordered partial semi-ring or your favorite partially ordered algebra, we will need to re-
place δ with a pair of predicates. So orientation of dependence seems to be fundamental
in general forms of probability theory as well.
Two events x, y ∈ X are mutually exclusive if and only if x ∩ y 6= ∅. This concept can
be extended to countable sets of events in a natural way. Also it is worthwhile to modify
the concept of mutual exclusivity as in following definition:
Definition 13.1. Two events x, y will be said to be weakly mutually exclusive (WME)
if and only if
x ∩ y 6= z & p(z) = 0.
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Most results of probability theory involving mutual exclusivity continue to hold with the
weaker assumption of WME and importantly is a better (though artificial) concept for
comparison with the situation for rough sets.
Definition 13.2. In the above context, let
• πxy if and only if p(x) · p(y) < p(x ∩ y)
• σxy if and only if p(x ∩ y) < p(x) · p(y)
Prop 13.1. All of the following hold in a probability space:
• πxyc ↔ σyx
• πxy ↔ πyx
• (x ∩ y 6= ∅ −→ (πxa & πya −→ π(x ∪ y)a))
• (x ∩ y 6= ∅ −→ (σxa & σya −→ σ(x ∪ y)a))
• (∅ 6= x ⊆ y −→ πxy)
• (x ∩ y = ∅ −→ σxy)
Instead of using the the function ∂(x, y), we can use the relations π, σ,as the former lacks
a comparable contamination-free counterpart in rough set theory and also has peculiar
properties like ∂(x, x) ∈ [0, 1/4].
Prop 13.2. In the probability space above 0 ≤ ∂(x, x) ≤ 0.25, −0.25 ≤ ∂(x, xc) ≤ 0 and
x, y are independent implies ∂(x, y) = 0, but not conversely.
Proof. The proof of the inequalities follow by a simple application of real analysis.
So it follows that the interpretation of the function ∂(x, y) as in [11] is actually incomplete.
It combines certainty of the event with dependence.
Even though we can speak of positive, negative and neutral regions corresponding to
an arbitrary subset A of a RBRST or CBRST S, natural ideas of dependence do not
correspond to the scenario in probability space. In fact,
Theorem 13.1. Predicates having properties identical with those of π and σ cannot be
defined in the context of 12.3.
Proof of this and more general results will appear separately.
14 Dependency Semantics of PRAX
We develop dependency based semantics in at least two ways. The internalization based
semantics is essentially about adjoining predicates to the Nelson algebra corresponding
to Rw(S). The cumulation based semantics is essentially about cumulating both the
semantics of R(S), adjusting operations and adjoining predicates. We use broader de-
pendency based predicates in this case, but the value of the method is in fusion of the
methodologies.
The central blocks of development of the cumulation based dependency semantics are
the following:
⋆ Take R(S) ∪ Rw(S) as the universal set of the intended partial/total algebraic
system.
⋆ Use a one point completion of τ to distinguish between elements of Rw(S) \ R(S)
and those in R(S).
⋆ Extend the idea of operational dependency to pairs of sets.
⋆ Extend operations of aggregation, commonality and dual suitably.
⋆ Interpretation and meaning of semantic dependence?
The first step is obvious, but involves elimination of other potential sets arising from the
properties of the map τ .
One Point Completion
Because we have R ⊆ Rw and Rw is transitive, so
Prop 14.1.
α ∈ R(S) ∩Rw(S) if and only if τ(α) = α.
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We adjoin an element 0 to R(S) ∪ Rw(S) to form R
∗(S) and extend τ (interpreted as
a partial operation) to τ as follows:
τ(α) =
{
τ(α) if α ∈ R(S),
0 if α /∈ R(S).
Note that this operation suffices to distinguish between elements common to R(S) and
Rw(S), and those exclusively in R(S) and not in Rw(S).
Dependency on Pairs
We have the option of considering all dependency relative the Nelson algebra or R(S).
First we consider everything relative the former -so that we may be able to avoid the
references to the latter.
Definition 14.1. By the paired infimal degree of dependence β+iτ1τ2ν1ν2 of α on β will
be defined as
(βiτ1ν1(e1α, e1β), βiτ2ν2(e2α, e2β)).
Here the infimums involved are the largest ν1(S) and ν2(S) elements contained in the
aggregation and the ejα is the j-th component of α.
We will however be interested in the following well defined specialization with τ1(S) =
τ2(S) = Gw(S), ν1 = δlw(S) and ν2 = Γuw(S) in all that follows. When we need to
specialize the dependencies between a element in R(S) and its image in Rw(S), we can
define:
Definition 14.2. Under the above assumptions, by the relative semantic dependence
̺(α) of α ∈ R(S), we will mean
̺(α) = β+i (α, τ(α)).
The idea of relative semantic dependence refers to elements in R(S) and it can be rein-
terpreted as a relation on Rw(S).
Internalization Based Semantics
Definition 14.3. A relation Υ on Rw(S) will be said to be a relsem-relation if and only
if
Υτ(α)γ ↔ (∃β ∈ τ⊣τ(α)) γ = ̺(β).
Note that, τ(α) = τ(β) by definition of τ⊣.
Through the above definitions we have arrived at the following internalized approximate
definition:
Definition 14.4. By an Approximate Proto Vague Semantics of a PRAX S we will mean
an algebraic system of the form
P(S) = 〈Rw(S), Υ∨,∧, c,⊥,⊤〉 ,
with 〈Rw(S), ∨w,∧w, c,⊥,⊤〉 being a Nelson algebra over an algebraic lattice and Υ being
as above.
Theorem 14.1. Υ has the following properties:
α = τ(α) −→ Υαα.
Υαγ −→ γ ∧w α = γ.
Υαγ & Υγα −→ α = γ.
Υ⊥⊥ & Υ⊤⊤.
Υαγ & Υβγ −→ Υ(α ∨w β)γ.
Proof. ⋆ If α = τ(α), then α = ̺(α) = β+i (α, τ(α)). So Υαα.
⋆ If Υαγ, then it follows from the definition of β+i , that the components of gamma
are respectively included in those of α. So γ ∧ α = γ.
⋆ Follows from the previous.
⋆ Proof is easy.
⋆ From the premise we have (∃µ ∈ τ⊣τ(α)) γ = ̺(µ) and (∃ν ∈ τ⊣τ(β)) γ = ̺(ν).
This yields (∃λ ∈ τ⊣τ(α ∨w β)) γ = ̺(λ) as can be checked from the components.
Υτ(α) = {γ ; Υτ(α)γ} is the approximate reflection of the set of τ -equivalent elements
in R(S) identified by their dependence degree. In the approximate semantics we do not
completely lose track of aggregation and commonality as the above theorem shows.
Definition 14.5. By the ̺/σ-semantic dependences ̺(α), σ(α) of α ∈ R(S), we mean
̺(α) = β+i (α, τ(α)) and
σ(α) = β+i (α, ((ϕ(e1α) \ e1α)
l, (ϕ(e2α) \ e1α)
u))
respectively. Such relations are optional in the internalization process.
For a falls-down semantics, the natural candidates include the ones corresponding to
largest equivalence or the largest semi-transitive contained in R. We reserve the latter
for a separate paper. For the former, the general technique (using σ(α)) extends to PRAX
as follows:
Definition 14.6. ⋆ Define a map
∫
from set of neighborhoods to l-definite elements
via ∫
([x]o) = ∪y∈[x]o[y]
and extend it to images of lo, uo via,∮
(Alo) = ∪[y]o⊆Alo
∫
([y]o).
⋆ Extend this to a map ⋉ : Ro(S) 7→ R(S) via
⋉(α) = (
∮
(e1α),
∮
(e2α)).
⋆ Define a predicate Π on Ro(S) as per
Παν ↔ (∃γ ∈ ⋉⊣ ⋉ (α))β+i (α, γ) = ν.
Let Πα = {ν ; Παν}.
⋆ By a Direct Falls Down semantics of PRAX, we will mean an algebraic system of
the form
I(S) = 〈Ro(S), Π,∨,∧, c,⊥,⊤〉 ,
with 〈Ro(S), ∨o,∧o,→, c,⊥,⊤〉 being a semi-simple Nelson algebra [39].
⋆ The falls down semantics determines a cover I∗(S) = {Πα ; α ∈ Ro(S)}
Theorem 14.2. In the above context, all of the following hold:
⋆ Παα.
⋆ (Παµ & Πµα −→ α = µ).
⋆ (Παγ −→ γ ⊆ α). The converse is false.
⋆ α 6= ⊥ & Παγ & Παµ −→ β+i (γ, µ) 6= ⊥.
⋆ µ ∈ Πα & µ ⊆ ν ⊆ α −→ ν ∈ Πα.
Cumulation Based Semantics
The idea of cumulation is correctly a way of enhancing our original semantics based
on proto-vagueness algebras with the Nelson algebraic semantics and the operational
dependence. We define it for a central problem relating to the underlying semantic
domains and
Definition 14.7. By a cumulative proto-vague algebra we will mean a partial algebra
of the form
C(S) =
〈
R∗(S), tau, ⊕,⊙,⊗, †,⊥,⊤
〉
.
Problem:
When can the cumulation based semantics be deduced from (that is the extra operations
can be defined from the original ones) within a full proto-vagueness algebra?

15 Geometry of Granular Knowledge
Interpretation
In this chapter we provide a brief overview of knowledge interpretation in the PRAX
contexts in the light of the results on representation of rough objects. For details of
the knowledge interpretation of rough sets, the reader is referred to [35, 40, 41]. By an
extension of those considerations any proto-transitive relation corresponds to knowledge.
Here we will be concerned with representation of knowledge and that in turn depends on
our choice of semantic domain - the most natural is the one corresponding to the rough
objects. But we know that representation is involved.
Any knowledge, however involved, may be seen as a collection of concepts with admissible
operations of reasoning defined on them. Knowledges associated PRAX have various
peculiarities corresponding to the semantic evolution of rough objects in it. To start
with, the semantic domains of representation properly contain the semantic domains
of interpretation. Not surprisingly, it is because the rough objects corresponding to l, u
cannot be represented perfectly in terms of objects from δlu(S) alone. In the nongranular
perspective too, this representation aspect should matter - ”should”, because it is matter
of choice during generalization from the classical case in the non granular approach.
The natural rough semantic domains of l, u is Meta-R, while that of lo, uo is O (say,
corresponding rough objects of τ(R)). These can be seen as separate domains or as
parts of a minimal containing domain that permits enough expression. As we have
seen knowledge is correctly representable in terms of atomic concepts of knowledge at
semantic domains placed between Meta-C and Meta-R and not at the latter. So the
characterization of possible semantic domains and their mutual ordering - leading to
their geometry is of interest.
The following will be assumed to be part of the interpretation:
⋆ Two types of rough objects corresponding to Meta-R and O and their natural
correspondence correspond to concepts or weakenings thereof. A concept relative
one semantic domain need not be one of the other.
⋆ A granule of the rough semantic domain O is necessarily a concept of O, but a
granule of Meta-R may not be a concept of O or Meta-R.
75
⋆ Critical points are not necessarily concepts of either semantic domain.
⋆ Critical points and the representation of rough objects require the rough semantic
domains to be extended.
The above obviously assumes that a PRAX S has at least two kinds of knowledge as-
sociated (in relation to the Pawlak-sense interpretation). To make the interpretations
precise, we will indicate them by I1(S) and Io(S) respectively (corresponding to the ap-
proximations to l, u and lo, uo respectively). The pair (I1(S), Io(S)) will also be referred
to as the generalized KI.
Definition 15.1. Given two PRAX S = 〈S, R〉, V = 〈S, Q〉, S will be said to be o-
coarser than V if and only if Io(S) is coarser than Io(V ) in Pawlak-sense ( that is
τ(R) ⊆ τ(Q)). Conversely, V will be said to be a o-refinement of S.
S will be said to be p-coarser than V if and only if I1(S) is coarser than I1(V ) in the
sense R ⊆ Q. Conversely, V will be said to be a p-refinement of S.
An extended concept of positive regions is defined next.
Definition 15.2. If S1 = 〈S,Q〉 and S2 = 〈S,P 〉 are two PRAX such that Q ⊂ R, then
by the granular positive region of Q with respect to R is given by gPOSR(Q) = {[x]
lR
Q :
x ∈ S}, where [x]lRQ is the lower approximation (relative R) of the Q-related elements of
x. Using this we can define the granular extent of dependence of knowledge encoded by
R on the knowledge encoded by Q by natural injections : gPOSR(Q) 7−→ GR.
Lower critical points can be naturally interpreted as preconcepts that are definitely in-
cluded in the discourse, while upper critical points are preconcepts that include most of
the discourse. The problem with this interpretation is that it’s representation requires
a semantic domain at which critical points of different kinds can be found. A key re-
quirement for such a domain would be the feasibility of rough counting procedures like
IPC [5]. We will refer to a semantic domain that has critical points of different types as
basic objects as a Meta-RC.
The following possible axioms of granular knowledge that also figure in [40] (due to the
the present author), get into difficulties with the present approach and even when we
restrict attention to I1(S):
1. Individual granules are atomic units of knowledge.
2. Maximal collections of granules subject to a concept of mutual independence are
admissible concepts of knowledge.
3. Parts common to subcollections of maximal collections of granules are also knowl-
edge.
The first axiom holds in weakened form as the granulation G for I1(S) is only lower
definite and affects the other. The possibility of other nice granulations being possible
for the PRAX case appears to be possible at the cost of other nice properties. So we can
conclude that in proper KR happens at semantic domains like Meta-RC where critical
points of different types are perceived. Further at Meta-R, rough objects may correspond
to knowledge or conjectures - if we require the concept of proof to be an ontological
concept or beliefs. The scenario can be made more complex with associations of O
knowledges.
From a non-granular perspective, in Meta-R rough objects must correspond to knowledge
with some of them lacking a proper evolution - there is no problem here. Even if we
permit O objects, then in the perspective we would be able to speak of two kinds of
closely associated knowledges.
The connections with non-monotonic reasoning and the approximate Nelson algebra se-
mantics developed in this monograph suggest further enhancements to the above. These
will be explored separately.

Further Directions and Remarks
In this research we have developed the basic theory of rough sets over proto transitive re-
lations, characterized the nature of rough objects and possible approximations, and have
developed two different algebraic semantics for the same. Some of the work constitute
a continuation of earlier work by the present author. Important connections between
approximations and operators of generalized operators of non-monotonic reasoning have
also been established in the monograph. This opens the door for many new kinds of se-
mantic connections that we hope to consider in future. Various examples at the level of
real-life applications are also outlined in the monograph. Concepts have been illustrated
through a persistent example. Knowledge interpretation in PRAX contexts have also ben
outlined.
In continuation of earlier work by the present author [2] on semantic consequences of
the relation between protransitivity and its approximations is developed in detail. The
theory of rough dependence from the knowledge perspective is also specialized to PRAX
and extended for the purposes of the semantics in this monograph. Connections with
probabilistic dependence is shown to be lacking any reasonable basis and we once again
unsettle unbridled frequentism in rough set theory. The relation of the developed theory
with entropy is strongly motivated by the knowledge interpretation [1, 40] and will be
part of future work.
The first algebraic semantics was seen to be inadequate in not being particularly elegant
and requiring additional predicates for a reasonable abstract representation theorem.
This was one reason for restricting derivations involving rough objects of τ(R). The
internalization of a semantics of PRAX objects in Nelson algebras through ideas of rough
dependence is shown to lead to a beautiful semantics. Further formulations of associated
logics will be part of a future paper. The technique can be extended to define approximate
semantics in various other rough set-theoretical contexts.
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